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Political Advertisements in the Era of Fleeting Indecent Images and Utterances 
 




Television and radio advertisements for years have been effective and popular 
campaign tools used by political candidates seeking to gain votes.  In an era of 
increasingly negative political campaign advertisements, some political figures and 
candidates have found themselves the target of negative broadcast advertisements 
suggesting that an opponent has engaged in some form of sexually immoral or somehow 
unacceptable conduct.  Election seasons in recent years have ushered in a new breed of 
increasingly vulgar and sexually charged political broadcast advertisements.1  So extreme 
are some advertisements in this new genre of political speech, they are dangerously close 
to violating federal law prohibiting the broadcast via television and radio of indecent 
materials.   
 
Scholars, the FCC, and the courts have pondered how regulators would deal with 
the issue of indecency in political broadcasting for years, focusing to date primarily on 
the body of cases dealing with political advertisements depicting abortions, aborted 
fetuses, and racial hate speech.2  Existing cases have turned on the statutory and 
                                                 
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  Thank you to Dean Hannah Arterian, 
Associate Professor Keith Bybee, Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media, Associate 
Dean Lisa Dolak, Professors Paula Johnson, William Wiecek, Leslie Bender, Rakesh Anand, the staff of 
the Barclay Law Library, David Solomon, Esq., and my research assistant Shaina Schallop. 
1 See “Too Hot for Corker”, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWkrwENN5CQ; and see 
“Bad Call” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDZ_bPYWjd8. 
2 See, e.g., In re Complaint by Atlanta NAACP, Atlanta, Ga. Concerning Section 315 Political Broadcast by 
J.B. Stoner, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972) (use of the term “nigger”) [hereinafter Stoner I]; In re Complaint by 
Julian Bond Atlanta NAACP Atlanta, Georgia Concerning Political Broadcasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (July 
28, 1978) (use of the term “nigger”) [hereinafter Stoner II]; Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media 
Bureau, to Vincent A. Pepper, Esq., Counsel, Gillette Communications of Atlanta, Inc., Irving Gastfreund, 
Esq., 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (Aug. 21, 1992) (regarding broadcast of political campaign advertisement containing 
abortion-related material) [hereinafter Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer].  See also Samantha 
Mortlock, Comment, What the [Expletive Deleted] is a Broadcaster to Do?  The Conflict Between Political 
Access Rules and the Broadcast Indecency Prohibition, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (2006). Mortlock 
correctly characterizes the “dilemma” facing broadcast licensees. 
See also In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, ¶ 187, n. 234 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order].  A 
complaint was filed against a broadcast licensee for the broadcast outside the safe harbor of a political 
advertisement that mentioned rape, sodomy, and molestation.  The advertisement did not feature any nude 
images or depictions of any of the described acts.  The narrator of the advertisement states:  
He used candy to lure the children into the house. Once inside, the three children were sexually 
molested. A four-year old girl raped. Her brothers- sodomized. A Belleville man was arrested and 
convicted for the crime after trying to develop pictures of the abuse. Despite prosecutor's 
objections, Judge Lloyd Karmeier gave him probation, saying "The court should grant leniency..." 
Another case where Karmeier let a violent criminal out into the community. Lloyd Karmeier -- the 
wrong choice for Supreme Court. Paid for by the Democratic Party of Illinois.   
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regulatory definitions of “indecency” and “obscenity” and suggest that broadcasters 
might have certain immunities and programming rights with respect to their decision to 
air political advertisements containing material they deem offensive, inappropriate, and 
harmful to children.3 
 
The newer, more sexually suggestive political advertisements present the dilemma 
at which lawmakers, courts, and scholars have hinted for years—how to reconcile three 
seemingly conflicting federal statutes which, on the one hand, seek to give political 
candidates greater access to the television and radio media and consequently to the eyes 
and ears of the electorate, yet, on the other, seek to remove indecent material from the 
broadcast airwaves during hours of the day when children are likely to be in the 
audience.4  These statutes obligate broadcast licensees to provide non-discriminatory and 
uncensored access to candidates for political office, yet fail to state an exception to 
broadcast indecency rules or to grant immunity to broadcasters forced to air political 
advertisements which contain at best sexually suggestive, and in the worst case, indecent, 
profane, or obscene material.5  While no broadcast licensee has been sanctioned by the 
government for the broadcast of an indecent political advertisement, the Federal 
Communications Commission (the “FCC” or the “Commission”) has never had to answer 
that specific question, and moreover, the law is not clear that broadcasters are immune 
from such sanction were it to broadcast such an advertisement.     
 
Interestingly, Larry Flynt, creator of Hustler magazine, launched a campaign for 
president in the 1980s.6  Flynt promised that his campaign advertisements would contain 
hard core pornography.7  The Commission was prepared at the time to issue a ruling 
permitting broadcasters to reject the advertisements.8  Flynt never requested airtime for 
the advertisements, and the FCC’s ruling never was issued.9 
 
This new breed of political advertisements, Flynt’s proposed advertisements not 
included, while not indecent under the FCC’s current definition, is closer to crossing the 
lines of indecency than were offensive racist advertisements and gruesome anti-abortion 
advertisements of years past.  The once hypothetical sexually suggestive political 
                                                                                                                                                 
Available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/buyingtime_2004/STSUPCT_IL_DPIL_KARMEIER_
CHILDREN.pdf.  The Commission stated “[b]ecause we find that the advertisement is not indecent, we 
need not decide whether the Commission may propose forfeitures against licensees that broadcast indecent 
political advertisements outside of the safe harbor.” 
3 See, e.g., Stoner I, 36 F.C.C.2d at 636-38; Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944; Mass Media Bureau Letter to 
Kaye Scholer, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5599-600; Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (prohibiting broadcast indecency); 47 U.S.C. § 312 (2006) (affording reasonable 
access to broadcast facilities for candidates for federal office); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006) (providing equal 
opportunities for use of broadcast facilities by candidates for the same office and prohibiting censorship). 
5 Id.. 
6 Interview of Bobby Baker, FCC Enforcement Bureau. 
7 See id. 
8  See id. 
9 In June 2007, Flynt placed an advertisement in the Washington Post offering $1 million for stories 
involving the sex lives of government officials. 
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advertisement is now a reality, and the truly indecent political advertisement might be on 
the near horizon.  One such sexually suggestive television advertisement appeared in 
2006 in Tennessee endorsing Republican Bob Corker in his race against Democrat 
Harold Ford, Jr. for a U.S. Senate seat.10  The Corker advertisement used sexually 
suggestive visual images to suggest that Ford frequented wild sex parties and had sexual 
liaisons with white women.11  Ford is black.  In the advertisement, the bare shoulders and 
face of an otherwise seemingly unclothed young blonde woman appeared on the screen 
as the young blonde winked and purred into the camera that she had previously met Ford 
at a Playboy party.12  The advertisement closed with another shot of the still questionably 
clothed young blonde teasing Ford to call her.13  Ford lost the election. 
 
Another television advertisement broadcast in New York in the same year 
endorsed Republican Raymond Meier in his U.S. congressional campaign against 
Democrat Michael Arcuri.14  The advertisement opened with superimposed images of a 
woman who appeared to be an exotic dancer straddling a chair and seductively dancing 
while purring “Hi, sexy…”15 Meanwhile, the target of the advertisement, Arcuri stared in 
the dancer’s direction while lasciviously and seductively licking his lips.16  The 
advertisement accused Arcuri of using Oneida County, New York taxpayer dollars to 
satisfy his sexual desires while on official business by calling an adult fantasy telephone 
hotline and then charging the call to his hotel room.17  Despite this advertisement, which 
ran in the days leading up to the election, Arcuri defeated his opponent to win the 
congressional seat.   
 
Industry insiders and regulators point to the remote possibility of a political 
candidate seeking airtime to broadcast a political advertisement containing indecent 
material.18  In an era where the media appears to take great fascination in the sex lives of 
elected officials and greater satisfaction in actually catching and embarrassing them for 
these exploits, we are certain to see more of this type of material emerge in political 
                                                 
10 The advertisement, titled “Too Hot for Corker”, sponsored by the Republican National Committee, opens 
with an African-American woman posing the question “Harold Ford looks good.  Isn’t that enough?”  Then 
camera captures short sound bites from a series of people who appear to be citizens on a city street making 
comments about how Ford wants to protect the privacy of terrorists, will increase taxes, favors gun control, 
is not worried about the threat of North Korea, and has taken money from producers of pornographic 





14 The advertisement titled “Bad Call” was paid for by the National Republican Congressional Committee.  




18 One easily can imagine an advertisement featuring protesters uttering expletives or wearing clothing 
containing indecent material, whereas an undeniably indecent political advertisement seems unimaginable 
to most. 
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campaign advertisements.19  In early 2009, Stormy Daniels, a pornographic movie star, 
announced her preliminary plans to run for the U.S. Senate from Louisiana against 
incumbent David Vitter who was involved in a notorious call-girl scandal that rocked 
Washington, DC in 2007.20  The possibility of one or both of the candidates incorporating 
indecent material in their campaign advertisements is not so far-fetched. 
 
This article does not assert that either the aforementioned anti-Ford or anti-Arcuri 
political advertisements squarely falls within the subject matter scope of the FCC’s 
definition of indecency, but that they do signal a gradual yet significant shift toward the 
willingness of political candidates and their supporters to pay for campaign 
advertisements with a sexual tinge.  This article asks a question that has been asked by 
other scholars—what is a broadcaster to do in the event it is presented with political 
material that might fall within the subject matter scope of the FCC’s definition of 
indecency.  It offers some resolutions to this conflict taking into consideration recent 
court cases dealing with the issue of broadcast indecency. 
 
This article addresses the recent struggle of the FCC and the courts to define 
indecency and to defend the continued relevance of current indecency rules in light of a 
converging and ever-changing technological environment.  The FCC has on more than 
one occasion sidestepped ruling on the issue where the material was determined not to 
have passed the threshold satisfying the definition of indecency.21  Moreover, none of 
these prior cases clearly answers the question of a broadcaster’s liability in the event a 
broadcaster airs or chooses not to air a political advertisement that actually is determined 
to be indecent, profane, or obscene as those terms have come to be defined.   
 
                                                 
19 Each the anti-Ford and the anti-Arcuri advertisements were broadcast in a news cycle when the public 
also was bombarded by unrelated broadcast news stories of a congressman engaging in inappropriate 
sexual e-mail exchanges, and perhaps worse, with underage boys and of an evangelical Christian minister 
using drugs and having sex with male prostitutes.  Michael Wolff, It’s The Adultery, Stupid, VANITY FAIR, 
June 20008, at 94 (stating that “[p]olitics is now about sex . . . Sex (sex, not gender) in politics is as 
significant a subtext as race.  It has the power to alter elections, undermine parties, and, possibly, change 
history. . . We want to know. . . Sex completes the picture—it explains so much. . . It’s a point of 
identification and differentiation.”  See Bill Cotterell and Jim Ash, Foley resigns from Congress, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Sept. 30, 2006, at 1A (discussing the resignation of Rep. Mark Foley (R-Fla.) 
amid allegations of substance abuse and inappropriate sexual conduct with underage congressional pages).  
See Alan Cooperman, Minister Admits to Buying Drugs and Massage, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at A02 
(reporting on the activities of evangelical minister Ted Haggard).  Since that time, the sordid details of the 
private lives of countless other politicians have flooded the broadcast and cable airwaves.  See, e.g., 
Senator Pleads Guilty in Sex-Sting Case, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 28, 2007, at A14 (reporting on the guilty 
plea of Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) stemming from his arrest for allegedly inappropriate behavior in an 
airport men’s restroom); see also Mark Mueller, Call Girl Scandal Engulfs Spitzer N.Y Governor Issues 
Apology, TIMES OF TRENTON (New Jersey), Mar. 11, 2008, at, A01 (reporting on the admission of New 
York governor Eliot Spitzer of association with high priced escort service; and see David Zucchino and 
Elizabeth Mehren, McGreevy’s Double Life Changed in a Single Day, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at A26 
(reporting on the revelation by the married New Jersey governor James E. McGreevy that he was gay and 
had an affair with a male staffer). 
20 See, e.g., Jonathan Tilove, Adult Film Actress Contemplates Run to Unseat Vitter; She Asks Flynt to be 
Campaign Manager, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 13, 2009, at 4. 
21
 See e.g., Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at ¶¶ 180-87; Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944. 
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Scholars have proposed resolutions to this dilemma, including among others, 
granting immunity from indecency sanctions and repealing some or all of the rules 
forming the dilemma.22  The recent racy political advertisements go to the heart of the 
question of how broadcasters, without clear statutory language, may handle requests by 
political candidates and their supporters to air campaign advertisements that more closely 
fit the Commission’s definition of indecency, and perhaps even the definitions of 
obscenity or profanity as well. 
 
Part I of the article describes the statutory conflict.  Part II addresses recent 
broadcast indecency actions including the indecency cases recently decided by the 
Second and Third Circuits and one currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Part III specifically evaluates recent political advertisements containing sexually 
suggestive material.  Part IV addresses how courts have handled earlier claims of 
offensive political speech offering insight and how they might handle future claims.  Part 
V of this article revisits some of the earlier proposals for resolution of the dilemma facing 
broadcast licensees and will suggest others. 
 
This article reiterates the call for immunity for broadcasters that air political 
advertisements containing indecent material.  In addition to evaluating these proposals, 
this article, in Part V, offers alternative resolutions of the issue including the suggestion 
that Congress could extend all three of the laws making up the statutory conflict beyond 
broadcast licensees to include all cable and satellite channels.  Additionally, the article 
suggests that Congress could repeal the broadcast indecency prohibition entirely taking 
into consideration the decreasing relevance of the rule in the context of the prevalence of 
cable and satellite video services and the emergence of the Internet.  The Commission 
also could carve out an express exception to indecency enforcement.  The worst 
resolution would be for the Congress to do nothing. 
 
In the absence of congressional action, courts could carve out a judicially created 
exception to the indecency statute as it has done in other contexts.  The answers to this 
problem will depend significantly on how the U.S. Supreme Court rules in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc.  regarding fleeting expletives. This article suggests that courts 
should uphold existing case law regarding the treatment of fleeting and isolated 
expletives and remand any FCC order imposing forfeiture based on any utterances of 
fleeting expletives or fleeting depictions of indecent images in the political context and 
otherwise.  In so doing, the courts would continue to force the FCC to refine its 
indecency definition to address constitutional vagueness issues and to offer a more 
reasoned explanation for the need to change its longstanding policy of not acting on 
isolated or fleeting indecent material as required by the Administrative Procedures Act.23 
 
 
I. The Statutory Conflict 
 
                                                 
22 See Mortlock, supra note 2, at 223-26. 
23 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2006). 
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 All FCC broadcast licensees must serve the “public interest, convenience and 
necessity.”24  That obligation has applied to the daily operations and overall mission of 
broadcasters since the earliest days of regulation of the industry.  Congress and the FCC 
have enacted statutes, rules, and regulations that balance the interests of the various 
entities that make up this public the FCC and its licensees are charged to serve.  Among 
these statutes are those prohibiting indecency and prohibiting censorship, and those 
making the broadcast airwaves available to political candidates.25 
 
The first statute in the trio is 18 U.S.C. § 1464 which prohibits the broadcast of 
indecent, obscene, or profane material over the broadcast airwaves.  The second statute is 
47 U.S.C. § 312 which requires licensees of broadcast stations to afford reasonable access 
to its facilities for all candidates for federal elective office.  Finally, 47 U.S.C. § 315 
requires broadcasters to afford equal opportunities to use broadcast facilities to all legally 
qualified candidates for the same political office and prohibits broadcasters from 
censoring political speech.26  Broadcasters have found themselves in a predicament when 
a candidate has sought to use a broadcast station to air an advertisement that contains 
material that could be characterized as indecent, obscene, or profane as these terms have 
been defined by federal case law and by the Federal Communications Commission (the 
“FCC” or the “Commission”).27 
 
In the context of indecency, obscenity, and profanity in the broadcast media, the 
FCC achieves this goal through a combination of governmental and citizen action.  The 
FCC does not monitor the programming of its licensees for the purpose of levying 
forfeitures for rule violations, but rather regulates in large part by acting upon complaints 
about media content that are filed with the agency by broadcast viewers and listeners 
                                                 
24 Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Sat. 56. 
25 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315, 326; 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
26 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).  47 C.F.R. § 73.1940.  A legally qualified candidate of public office is defined as 
any person who has publicly announced that he or she is a candidate for public office, meets the 
qualifications for serving in that office, is eligible to be elected to that office, and makes a substantial 
showing that he or she is a bona fide candidate for the office or for nomination to the office.  47 U.S.C. § 
326 also prohibits the FCC from engaging in censorship of broadcast material.  See also  In re Complaint 
Under Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended, Letter to Metromedia, Inc. Regarding 
Socialist Labor Party of California, 40 F.C.C. 423 (1964); and see Public Notice, Use of Broadcast 
Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 860 (1970). 
27 While § 312 and § 315 do apply to cable and satellite systems, they have only limited applicability in 
these contexts.  The obligations in those sections extend to cable and direct broadcast satellite service 
(“DBS”) channels only to the extent that the relevant programming is carried on a cable television or DBS 
system channel “subject to the exclusive control” of the cable or DBS provider.  47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (2006) 
(emphasis added) (cable); 47 C.F.R. § 25.701 (2006) (“DBS origination programming is defined as 
programming (exclusive of broadcast signals) carried on a DBS facility over one or more channels and 
subject to the exclusive control of the DBS provider.”)  A cable system is defined as any facility designed 
to provide video programming to multiple subscribers through “closed transmission paths.” It does not 
include, inter alia, “a facility that serves only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under 
common ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities us[e] any public right of 
way.”  47 U.S.C. § 522(7)(B)(2006).  FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309-10 (1993).  
These rules do not apply to the Internet. 
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after the material has been broadcast.28  At the root of indecency, obscenity, and profanity 
determinations is the contemporary community standard and the context in which the 
material is presented.29  Deputizing the entire public as the watchdogs or monitors of 
broadcast material, in theory, results in agency decisions more closely reflecting these 
community standards than would be possible were those determinations made solely by a 
small number of commissioners or FCC staffers.  Moreover, this public watchdog 
function is essential because, as discussed herein, the FCC is prohibited from engaging in 
censorship of all broadcast material, not just that of a political nature.30   
 
Taking into consideration contemporary community standards and the context of 
political speech, an argument could be made that political advertisements should be a safe 
haven from presentation of gratuitous, confusing, and often untrue private, intimate, and 
sexually suggestive matters.  The political broadcast advertisement, it could be argued, 
simply is an inappropriate venue for the racy content commonplace in other genres of 
television and radio broadcast programming.  With the amount of information Americans 
process daily from multiple media sources, it has become more difficult to sift through it 
all and to find the real truth particularly when convoluted by irrelevant, misleading, and 
gratuitous sexual or sexually suggestive content.  Political broadcast material should be 
free from this type of often misleading content.  The political process ideally would seek 
to highlight truths and inform the electorate, but not pander, titillate, or seduce with 
misleading and gratuitous sexually suggestive content.   
 
As currently written, the statutes and regulations enacted to serve the public 
interest in protecting children from the potential harms of exposure to indecent, obscene, 
and profane material broadcast via the public airwaves are in conflict with the laws that 
have been enacted to enhance and protect the political process by protecting the rights of 
candidates for political office to use the public airwaves for purposes of furthering their 
political campaigns.31  This conflict lies in the inability of a broadcaster to reject 
candidate-sponsored political advertisements that contains indecent, obscene, or profane 
material.  By leaving this issue unresolved, the federal government has hogtied 
broadcasters when it comes to their discretion to pick and choose which political 
advertisements they will air and when during the broadcast day they will air them.  
 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Letter to Mr. Daniel Becker, Becker for Congress, 7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (Oct. 30, 1992) citing Letter 
to Christian Action Network released June 12, 1992 (stating that the FCC “does not render indecency 
rulings in advance of a broadcast.”) 
29 See In the Matter of Industry Guidance On the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002, ¶ 9 (Apr. 6, 2001) 
hereinafter Indecency Policy Statement]; and see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) 
(placing significance on the context in which the material is presented and stating that the Court was not 
ruling that “an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction . . . .”). 
30 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 326 (2006). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (prohibition against the broadcast of indecent, profane, or obscene material).  
See also 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (2006) (limiting the number of minutes that may be devoted to commercials 
during children’s television programming); 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 (2006) (reasonable access for federal 
candidates), § 315 (equal opportunities for all candidates and censorship prohibition).  See also 47 C.F.R. § 
4165 (2006) (indecent broadcasts); and see 47 C.F.R. § 4170 (2006)  (obscene broadcasts). 
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A. 18 U.S.C. § 1464:  Prohibition Against Broadcast Indecency, 
Obscenity, and Profanity 
 
Section 1464 of title 18 of the United States Code provides that “[w]hoever utters 
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be 
fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”32  The purpose of this law is to 
protect children from harmful material broadcast over the public airwaves.33  In addition 
to the two-year prison term, violation of this section also subjects a broadcast licensee to 
license revocation and a fine of up to $325,000 per violation.34  The Commission has 
clearly stated that it does not regulate indecency on cable or satellite subscription 
services.35   
 
 
 1. Indecent Material 
 
Indecent programming is “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory organs or activities.”36  It is material intended to pander or titillate, or that is 
vulgar or lewd.37  Although indecent speech receives First Amendment protection, courts 
                                                 
32 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).  This provision was moved from the Communications Act to the Criminal 
Code in 1948.   
33 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-51. 
34 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(a)(4), (b)(1)(2006); 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(2006).  “If the violator is….a broadcast 
station licensee or permittee; … and, is determined…to have broadcast obscene, indecent, or profane 
language, the amount of any forfeiture penalty…shall not exceed $325,000 for each violation or each day 
of a continuing violation, except that the amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a 
total of $3,000,000 for any single act or failure to act.”  In 2006, Congress raised the maximum fine to 
$325,000 per violation following several years of highly publicized indecent broadcast incidents.  47 
U.S.C. 503(b)(2)(C).  Previously, the base monetary sanction for violation of the FCC's indecency, 
profanity, and/or obscenity restrictions had been $7,000 per violation with a maximum fine of $32,500 per 
violation.  The fine may be adjusted based on such factors as the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity 
of the violation, the degree of culpability of the violator, the violator’s history of prior offenses, the 
violator’s ability to pay, and such other factors as justice may require.  See also Enforcement Policies 
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 66 Fed. Reg. 21984, 21986 (May 2, 2001); and Broadcast Decency 
Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, § 2, 120 Stat. 491 (2006) codified at 47 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(2)(C)(2006).  
35 See In the Matter of Various Complaints Against the Cable/Satellite Television Program “Nip/Tuck”, 
Mar. 4, 2005.  While all services are subject to the reasonable access, equal opportunity, and censorship 
rules, albeit to differing degrees, cable and satellite service providers are not subject to the same rules 
governing indecency and profanity as are traditional over-the-air television and radio broadcast licensees.  
Obscenity, however, is prohibited on all services at all times.  47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2006). 
36 See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), New York, New York, 56 
F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-41.  Because the FCC is expressly prohibited 
from censoring broadcast material, and because it does not regulate by monitoring broadcast material, the 
FCC relies almost exclusively on the viewing and listening public to register complaints regarding 
offensive and inappropriate broadcast programming.  It is this larger community standard by which the 
FCC regulates and reacts to programming alleged by listeners and viewers to be indecent, obscene, or 
profane. 
37 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747. 
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have upheld the FCC’s authority to prohibit television and radio broadcasts of indecent 
material during times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children will be in 
the viewing or listening audience.38  Broadcasters may broadcast indecent and profane 
material to the safe harbor viewing period of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.—those hours of the 
day when children are less likely to be in the viewing and listening audience.39  This is 
called channeling. 
 
In determining liability for the broadcast of indecent material, the FCC applies a 
two-prong test.40  First, the Commission will determine whether the speech indeed is 
indecent under the Commission’s definition of the term.41  Second, it will consider the 
context in which the speech arises, taking into consideration whether it is “patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium.42  To determine whether the material broadcast is indecent, the FCC looks at 
three primary factors: (1) whether the description or depiction is explicit or graphic; (2) 
whether the material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions or depictions of sexual or 
excretory organs; and (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate or 
shock.43  Neither of these three factors alone is determinative, but must be balanced to 
determine whether the material, taking into consideration its context, is indecent.44 
 
The prohibition against indecent material, to date, has turned on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.45  In that case, the Court was asked to 
resolve the question of whether the FCC could fine a broadcaster for airing during the 
afternoon daylight hours, the 12-minute “Filthy Words” monologue by George Carlin in 
which he identified seven words “you couldn’t say on the public . . . airwaves” and then 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., id. at 749; Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996) [hereinafter ACT III]; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“when we consider the further circumstance that the material comes 
unwanted into homes where children might see or hear it against parental wishes or consent, there are 
legitimate reasons for regulating it.”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (“It is true that we have 
repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. 
39 See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669-670 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), c45ert. 
denied, ACT III. 
40 See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 
21 F.C.C.R. 13299, ¶ 15, FCC 06-166 (Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Remand Order]. 
41 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (“Context is all important” in indecency determinations).  Indecency Policy 
Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002, ¶ 8; Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2667, ¶ 12. 
42 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (“Context is all important” in indecency determinations.).  Indecency 
Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002, ¶ 8; Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2667, ¶ 12. 
43 Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2668, ¶ 14; Indecency Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002-15, ¶¶ 8-23.  
See also Application of Pacifica Foundation; For Renewal of License for Noncommercial Station 
WPFW(FM), Washington, D.C., 95 F.C.C.2d 750, ¶¶ 16-18 (1983) (defining indecency and finding that 
isolated use of expletives during the license term “fail[ed] to raise a substantial and material question of 
fact as to whether renewal of WPFW's license would serve the public interest, convenience and necessity.”) 
44 Indecency Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8010, ¶¶ 9, 20 citing Tempe Radio, Inc. (KUPD-FM), Notice 
of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 12 F.C.C.R. 21828 (Mass Media Bur. 1997); EZ New Orleans, Inc. 
(WEZB(FM)), Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 12 F.C.C.R. 4147 (Mass Media Bur. 1997). 
45 See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726. 
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proceeded to repeat them over and over in various forms.46  The Court upheld the FCC’s 
authority to regulate broadcast indecency.47   
 
The Court in Pacifica acknowledged that the media “have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.”48  Furthermore, it agreed that “because 
broadcasting in uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read” it has the 
potential to affect them particularly in a negative way.49   It can “enlarge[] a child’s 
vocabulary in an instant.”50  Therefore, “the government’s interest in the well-being of its 
youth and supporting parents claim to authority in their own household justified the 
regulation of otherwise protected expression.”51  The holding in Pacifica, however, is not 
limited to use of the seven words used by George Carlin in “Filthy Words.”52  Depending 
on the context in which the speech is uttered, innuendo and double entendre may be 
considered indecent when coupled with other explicit references.53  Pacifica suggests that 
channeling indecent broadcasts to the wee hours of the morning, avoids exposing 
children to material that might be inappropriate for them.54   
 
Pursuant to Pacifica, indecent speech must involve more than an isolated or 
fleeting use of an offensive word.55  Until recently, the Court and the FCC have reasoned 
that they will focus on deliberate and repetitive use of expletives and other such language 
used in a patently offensive manner.56  After 30 years of adherence to this policy the FCC 
changed its policy significantly and has put broadcast licensees on notice that it no longer 
will permit the broadcast of even fleeting and isolated use of profanity.57  As discussed 
below, the Court has agreed to hear the appeal of a case involving the use of fleeting 
words that in their common usage describe sexual or excretory organs or activities.58 
 
 
 2. Profane Material 
 
                                                 
46 Id. at 729-30. 
47 Id. at 735-38. 
48 Id. at 748. 
49 Id. at 749. 
50 Id. at 749. 
51 Id. at 749. 
52 See In the Matter of Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order (1987), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 
(1987) [hereinafter Pacifica M&O].   
53 See, e.g., In the Matter of Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Penn., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 
F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
54 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-51; Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. 
55 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
56 Pacifica M&O, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699, ¶ 13; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (“We have not decided that an 
occasional expletive . . would justify any sanction or . . . would justify a criminal prosecution.”). 
57 Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globes 
Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes Order]; see generally Omnibus 
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664; see generally Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13299. 
58 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2nd Cir. 2007), cert. granted FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2008), 07-582 (2007) (addressing the isolated 
and fleeting use of various forms of the words “shit” and “fuck” and other profane material). 
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Traditionally, the Courts and the FCC defined profanity as blasphemy. 59  The 
Commission adopted a new definition in 2004 in its Golden Globes Order, which 
broadened the definition of profanity to include speech beyond that which might be 
considered blasphemous.60  The definition adopted in 2004 defined profane as “those 
personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting 
language which under contemporary community standards is so grossly offensive to 
members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.”61  This new 
definition was overturned by the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC 
where the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the Commission’s Omnibus Remand 
Order.62  The Second Circuit found that the FCC’s new definition of “profane” 
“substantially overlap[s] the statutory term ‘indecent’ . . . render[ing] the statutory term 
‘indecent’ superfluous.”63  No new definition has been adopted, nor was the issue raised 
in the Commission’s Petition for Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.64 
 
 
 3. Obscene Material 
 
While indecent and profane material receive some First Amendment protection, 
obscene material does not, and, therefore, may not be broadcast at any time on broadcast 
stations nor on cable or satellite channels.65  The Supreme Court has opined that to be 
                                                 
59 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444; Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931); Gagliardo v. 
United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966); In re Complaint by Warren B. Appleton, Brockton, Mass. 
28 F.C.C. 2d 36 (1971). 
60 Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at ¶ 14.   
We recognize that the Commission's limited case law on profane speech has focused on what is profane in 
the context of blasphemy . . . but nothing in those cases suggests either that the statutory definition of 
profane is limited to blasphemy . . . Broadcasters are on notice that the Commission in the future will not 
limit its definition of profane speech to only those words and phrases that contain an element of blasphemy 
or divine imprecation, but, depending on the context, will also consider under the definition of "profanity" 
the "F-Word" and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive as the "F-Word," to the 
extent such language is broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.  .  . We will analyze other potentially profane 
words or phrases on a case-by-case basis. 
61 Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 at ¶ 13 (quoting Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 
(7th Cir. 1972); and see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735-38, 750.  The Court, in Pacifica, decided the case based 
on principles similar to the law of public nuisance which favors channeling behavior over outright 
prohibitions.  The Court favored channeling material that depicts or describes sexual or excretory activity 
in a patently offensive way to times of the day when children are less likely to be in the audience.  While 47 
U.S.C. § 326 prohibits government censorship of broadcast material prior to its broadcast, it does not 
prohibit the FCC from reviewing the content of broadcast material after the fact and sanctioning licensees 
who broadcast indecent, obscene, or profane material. 
62 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 467. 
63 Id. at  467) (‘our cannons of statutory construction do not permit such an interpretation”). 
64 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2008), 07-582 (2007). 
65 See, e.g., Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).  Separate 
statutes prohibit the distribution and transmission of obscene material on cable and satellite television 
services.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1468 (prohibiting distribution of obscene material on cable and satellite 
television); 47 U.S.C. § 559 (prohibiting transmission of obscene material on cable services.  See also 47 
U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 544(d), 558. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) reads: 
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found obscene, material must meet a three-prong test: (1) an average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, must find that the material, as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest (i.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts);66 (2) the 
material must depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by applicable law; and (3) the material, taken as a whole, must lack serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.67  The Supreme Court has indicated that this 
test is designed to cover hard-core pornography and not other forms of indecent or 
offensive speech.68   
 
In response to the racist tirades of U.S. senatorial candidate J.B. Stoner in the 
1970s, the NAACP asked the FCC to ban the word “nigger” as obscene or indecent in 
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica.69  The NAACP 
misunderstood the Court’s holding in Pacifica to apply to racist hate speech.  In response, 
the FCC concluded that use of the racial epithet “nigger” is neither indecent nor obscene 
under its rules.70  No matter how offensive the term, it describes neither sexual organs, 
sexual or excretory activity, nor sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner as is 
required pursuant to the agency’s rules.  
   
 
B. 47 U.S.C. § 312:  Sanctions for Failure to Provide Reasonable Access 
and for Broadcast of Indecent Material 
 
In recognition of the extraordinarily influential role played by the broadcast media 
in shaping the public’s views and opinions on political matters, Congress enacted 47 
U.S.C. § 312(a) seeking to give political candidates for federal office greater access to 
this influential medium of public communication with potential voters.71  Congress also 
sought to contain the cost of this access.72 Section 312(a) of the Communications Act 
                                                                                                                                                 
Whoever knowingly utters any obscene language or distributes any obscene matter by means of 
cable television or subscription services on television, shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than 2 years or by a fine in accordance with this title, or both. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 559 reads: 
 
Whoever transmits over any cable system any matter which is obscene or otherwise unprotected 
by the Constitution of the United States shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 
66 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 487-489 (1957)). 
67 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
68 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, (1964) (C.J. 
Harlan and J. Clark, dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) (“This Court has 
consistently held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation on the state 
police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
69 Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 943-44; 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1987); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-51. 
70 Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944-45. 
71 Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a). 
72 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 379 (1981), citing Federal Campaign Act of 1971:  Hearings on S.1, 
S. 382, and S. 956 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
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provides for administrative sanctions for, among other things, the broadcast of indecent 
material73 and the failure to allow candidates for federal elective office reasonable access 
to broadcast stations.74     
 
Paragraph (7) of § 312(a) affords legally qualified candidates for federal office an 
affirmative right of reasonable access to a licensee’s station and allows for license 
revocation in the event of a broadcaster’s  
 
willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or 
to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the 
use of a broadcasting station, other than a non-commercial 
educational broadcast station, by a legally qualified 
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his 
candidacy.75 
 
The statute does not define reasonable access, nor do FCC regulations offer any 
one particular definition. The FCC, however, has developed an individualized, case-by-
case set of interpretative factors to be considered to effectuate the reasonable access 
requirements of § 312(a)(7) including the following:  (i) a candidate’s stated purpose in 
seeking air time; (ii) the amount of time previously sold to the candidate; (iii) the 
disruptive impact on the broadcaster’s regular program schedule; and (iv) the likelihood 
of requests for time by rival candidates under federal broadcast equal opportunity 
requirements.76  The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s standard and practice of case-by-
case determinations of reasonableness in CBS v. FCC.77  The Court also opined that this 
                                                                                                                                                 
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore); and S. Rep. No. 92-96, 20 (1971) U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1972, 1773-1774. 
73 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(7)(2006). 
74 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (providing for administrative sanctions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464—
broadcast of indecent material); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).  The FCC has further regulated these requirements 
in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2006).  Paragraph (a)(6) provides that the Federal Communications Commission 
may revoke any station license or construction permit for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  18 U.S.C. § 1464 
also provides for imprisonment of not more than two years.  Section 312 also provides for license 
revocation in the event a licensee broadcasts a lottery or engages in mail fraud.   The Court of Appeals 
deferred to the FCC on the determination of when a campaign actually has begun.  See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 
629 F.2d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
75 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(7)(2007).  Added to the Communications Act by the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225.     
76 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 375, 387 (1981); In the Matter of Codification of the Commission’s 
Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 681 (1991); 47 F.C.C.2d 516, 516-17 (1974); and see 68 
F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089, 1091, n. 14 (1978) (“there may be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably 
refuse broadcast time to political candidates during certain parts of the broadcast day.”)  See Becker, 95 
F.3d at 80.  These circumstances are not defined.  The Commission has indicated that in weighing these 
factors, it will focus on two issues:  “(1) has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards in deciding 
whether to grant a request for access, and (2) is the broadcaster’s explanation for his decision reasonable in 
terms of those standards?”  CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).   
77 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 386-91 (1981). 
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practice did not “improperly involve the FCC in the electoral process or significantly 
impair broadcasters’ editorial discretion.”78    
 
Broadcasters must justify denials of access and may not use any of these 
considerations as a pretext for denial of access.79  Additionally, broadcasters must cite “a 
realistic danger of substantial program disruption” to justify denial of reasonable access.80  
Generally, broadcasters are accorded deference provided they demonstrate that they have 
acted reasonably and in good faith.81  Blanket, across-the-board types of policies denying 
access to the station will not be accorded such deference upon agency review of a denial 
and very likely will be found unreasonable.82 
 
The affirmative right conferred upon federal candidates by the section is limited.  
This statutory provision does not confer upon political candidates any affirmative right of 
access to a broadcast station during any particular time of the broadcast day, but 
candidates may not be excluded from certain parts of the broadcast day including prime 
time.83  Similarly, there is no right to time during any particular program.84  Nor is there 
any promise of free air time.85  Candidates must be willing to pay for the air time.86 
 
 




 1. Equal Opportunities for Competing Candidates 
 
While § 312(a)(7) provides candidates for federal office affirmative, albeit, 
reasonable access to use broadcast stations, § 315 of the Communications Act merely 
provides candidates for any public office equal opportunities of access to a licensee’s 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at, 387. 
80 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
81 See, e.g.,  In re Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. Against The ABC, CBS & 
NBC Television Networks, 74 F.C.C.2d 657, 665, 674 (Nov. 28, 1979); See, e.g., In re Complaint of 
Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. Against The ABC, CBS and NBC Television Networks, 74 
F.C.C.2d 631, 642-51 (Nov. 21, 1979); and see FCC 1978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1089-1092, 
1094. 
82 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) citing 302 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 386-387, 629 F.2d 1, 18-19 
(1980). 
83 See FCC 1978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1090, ¶ 40; In Re Public Notice Concerning Licensee 
Responsibility Under Amendments to The Communications Act Made By The Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C. 2d 516 (1974) [hereinafter Licensee Responsibility]. 
84 In the Matter of Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 682 
(1991). 
85 FCC 1978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1088, ¶ 35; In the Matter of Codification of the 
Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. at 687, ¶ 49. 
86 See Kennedy for Preside Comm. v. FCC, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 174-178, 636 F.2d 432, 446-450 
(1980); Public Notice, The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2288-2290 
(Aug. 16, 1978). 
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station as are afforded other candidates.87  The intent of this section is to afford rival 
candidates a comparable audience reach.  Specifically, § 315 provides 
 
[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally 
qualified candidate for any public office to use a 
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to 
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such 
broadcasting station.88 (Emphasis added).  
 
Section 315 does not grant candidates an affirmative right of reasonable access to 
a broadcast station in the way § 312(a)(7) does to federal candidates, but merely provides 
that once a broadcaster has provided access to its station to one candidate for any political 
office, it must provide the same access to its station to other candidates for that same 
political office.89  Section 315 also contains four exceptions.90  The section provides that 
                                                 
87 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006). 
88 Id. 
89 This includes the same amount of airtime the same time slots, and the same prices.  See, e.g., In re E.A. 
Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61 (1945) (not only must candidates be offered the same amount of airtime, but the 
desirability of the time slots offered competing candidates also must be comparable); see also In re D.L. 
Grace, Esq., 40 F.C.C. 297 (1958); Public Notice, Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public 
Office, 24 F.C.C.2d at 838, 869, 877 (1970); In re Television Co. of America, 40 F.C.C. 319 (1961); and 
see In re Political Broadcast Rates, 40 F.C.C. 265 (1955) (FCC does not mandate particular rates, but 
requires equal treatment of candidates in rates charged).  The rule confers a legal right to a candidate only 
when an opposing candidate, not someone speaking on behalf of the opposing candidate, has used the 
station to advance his or her candidacy.  See Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 
1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 909 (1951).  While Section 315 does not specifically address the rights of 
groups supporting or opposing candidates to access the broadcast station, pursuant to FCC policy, third 
parties might have a right of equal opportunity in certain circumstances.  Though considered to be related 
to the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine, the Zapple Doctrine, which seems to have survived, is viewed as a 
quasi-equal opportunity principle that entitles supporters of a candidate with substantial support—generally 
nominees of major political parties—time comparable to that offered supporters of another candidate.  The 
Zapple Doctrine does not entitle supporters to the same degree of time, but rather a roughly comparable 
opportunity to buy comparable time.  This doctrine was created to deal with potential political imbalances 
that could be brought about by the influence of third-party supporters of candidates to avoid triggering 
equal opportunities for competing candidates.  In Re Request by Nicholas Zapple, Communications 
Counsel, Committee on Commerce for Interpretive Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine 
(“Nicholas Zapple”), 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 707–09 (1970).  Section 312 and Section 315 were invoked in an 
interesting way during the 2004 presidential campaign.  In Fall, 2004, the Sinclair Broadcast Group 
(“Sinclair”) ordered all of its 60 plus broadcast stations to show the film “Stolen Honor:  Wounds That 
Never Heal” (“Stolen Honor”), a film featuring Vietnam veterans criticizing Democratic candidate John 
Kerry’s anti-war activities upon returning to the U.S. following his wartime service.  Airing the film would 
have preempted regularly scheduled primetime television programming.  Democrats claimed that Sinclair 
violated the equal time provision by not giving Kerry an opportunity to respond.  The party also claimed 
that the film amounted to a prolonged free political advertisement for George W. Bush that violated the 
campaign finance rules by not also airing a pro-Kerry advertisement of equal length.  It was characterized 
as an “illegal campaign contribution.”  Sinclair eventually decided not to air the entire “Stolen Honor” film 
choosing instead to show “A POW Story:  Politics, Pressure and the Media” which included portions of 
“Stolen Honor” and segments of another film “Going Upriver:  The Long War of John Kerry” that Sinclair 
claimed contained segments more flattering to John Kerry.  In an interesting twist of application of the 
reasonable access and equal time statutes, the equal time provision and reasonable access provisions would 
have given more access to George W. Bush because it was John Kerry whose image appeared on screen.. 
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there has been no use of the station by a legally qualified candidate when the candidate 
appears in: 
 
(1) a bona fide newscast; (2) a bona fide news interview91; 
(3) a bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the 
candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or 
subjects covered by the news documentary) 92; or (4) on-
the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but 




 2. Censorship Prohibition and Channeling 
 
In addition to equal opportunity protection, § 315 also prohibits broadcasters from 
censoring broadcast material. 94  It provides in relevant part  
 
such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the 
material broadcast under the provisions of this section.  No 
obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any 
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such 
candidate.95 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006). 
91 See also In re Station KFDX-TV, 40 FCC 374 (1962) (Bona fide news interviews must be regularly 
scheduled for the purposes of § 315).  See also In re Capitol Radio Networks, FCC DA96-573, Apr. 11, 
1996; In re Arthur R. Block, FCC DA 92-1458, Letter dated Oct. 21, 1992 (The FCC also will consider 
whether the licensee has independent control over the program and whether the broadcaster has control 
over format, content, and selection of interview participants are based on the licensee’s good faith judgment 
as to the participant’s newsworthiness, rather than for the purpose of furthering the participant’s political 
candidacy.). 
92 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).  See, e.g., In re Victor E. Ferrall, Jr., 46 F.C.C. 2d 1113 (1974) (The candidate’s 
appearance must be incidental to the presentation of the subject matter and not simply to advance the 
candidate’s candidacy.). 
93 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).  See also Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417 (1980) (three 
factors will be considered to determine whether coverage of a candidate’s press conference is exempt as 
on-the-spot coverage of a news event:  (i) whether the conference is live; (ii) whether the broadcaster 
makes a good faith determination that the conference is a bona fide news event; and (iii) whether the 
broadcaster demonstrates any favoritism toward the candidate.). See also In re Wade H. Hargove, 66 F.C.C. 
2d 1055 (1976) (an appearance by a candidate on a newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news 
documentary or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event “is not use of the a broadcasting station for 
the purposes of § 315(a)(4).”).  See also NOW, New York City Chapter v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (1977) (The 
Commission will not question a broadcast licensee’s judgment as to what constitutes news “unless there is 
extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortion or news staging or unless licensee consistently fails to report 
news events of public importance that cannot in good faith be ignored.”). 
94 47 U.S.C. § 315; 7 F.C.C.R. 678 (1991).  See also 47 U.S.C. § 326 (prohibiting the Federal 
Communications Commission from engaging in censorship of broadcast content). 
95 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2007). 
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Nowhere does § 315 expressly state that § 1464 does not apply to political 
broadcast material.  Additionally, nowhere does § 1464 state that political advertisements 
are excepted from the indecency, obscenity, and profanity prohibition.  In other words, 
although neither a licensee nor the government may not censor political broadcast 
material under § 315 and § 326, respectively, neither section expressly excepts political 
broadcast material from what may be considered actionably indecent. 
 
Section 326 prohibits the government from censoring or prohibiting speech up 
front, but does not prohibit the government from punishing, after the fact, speech that 
violates § 1464.96  This loophole and that in § 312 are what potentially could find 
broadcasters in a quandary unable to prohibit the speech themselves, unable to request 
that the Commission prohibit the speech, yet not insulated from liability should indecent 
political speech be broadcast over the public airwaves. 
 
In the 1970s, broadcasters were faced with the dilemma of what to do when a 
political candidate requested broadcast time to air a political advertisement in which the 
candidate spewed white supremacist hate speech and boldly referred to blacks as 
“niggers.”97  By the early 1990s, broadcasters were faced with the dilemma of how to 
handle requests for airtime by candidates for political office to broadcast advertisements 
depicting aborted fetuses.98  At the time, it was argued by broadcasters and some in the 
public that the advertisements either were indecent, obscene, profane, or all of the above, 
and therefore should be barred from broadcast television altogether.99  In the alternative, 
it was suggested that the advertisements be relegated to hours of the viewing day when 
                                                 
96 See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S, 726, 737-38 (1978) (“We conclude, therefore, that § 326 does not limit the 
commission’s authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane 
broadcasting.”).  In 1927 and 1934, the anticensorship provision of § 326 and the indecency prohibition of 
§ 1464 were enacted in the same section.  A 1948 revision of the Criminal Code to include U.S. statutory 
provisions located in other titles, the prohibition against the broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane 
material was removed from the Communications Act and reenacted as part of the Criminal Code.  Courts 
have concluded that this change in the U.S. Code was not intended to change the applicability of the 
anticensorship provision of § 326.   
97 See generally Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d 943; Stoner I, 36 F.C.C.2d 635.  During his U.S. senatorial 
campaign in Georgia, J. B. Stoner made a political announcement stating: 
 
I am J. B. Stoner.  I am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the white people.  I am the 
only candidate who is against integration.  All of the other candidates are race mixers to one 
degree or another.  I say we must repeal Gambrell’s civil rights law.  Gambrell’s law takes jobs 
from us whites and gives those jobs to the niggers.  The main reason why niggers want integration 
is because the niggers want our white women.  I am for law and order with the knowledge that you 
cannot have law and order and niggers too.  Vote white.  This time vote your convictions by 
voting white racist J. B. Stoner into the run-off election for U.S. Senator.  Thank you.  Stoner I, 36 
F.C.C.2d at 636. 
98 See generally Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599 (regarding broadcast of 
political campaign advertisement containing abortion-related material). 
99 See, e.g.,  Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944-45; Stoner I, 36 F.C.C.2d at 635 (where NAACP argued that use 
of the word “nigger” posed an imminent and immediate threat to the public); see also, Mass Media Bureau 
Letter to Kaye Scholer, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5599-600. 
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children were less likely to be in the viewing audience and when the chance of potential 




II. Immunity and Possible Exceptions to the Political Broadcast Rules 
 
 
A. Broadcaster Immunity for Political Speech Where Censoring is 
Prohibited 
 
In Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota 
Division v, WDAY, Inc., a broadcast licensee sought to remove defamatory material from 
speeches made by legally qualified candidates for political office.101  Presuming that § 
315 was interpreted to ban such censorship of political speeches, the broadcaster sought 
legal immunity from suit for broadcast of the libelous statements.102  In WDAY, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the equal opportunity mandate of § 315 opining that the basic 
purpose of § 315 is “full and unrestricted discussion of political issues of legally qualified 
candidates.”103  Additionally, in holding that § 315 prohibits censorship, the Court in 
WDAY aptly recognized that the broadcaster is faced with a difficult decision in deciding 
whether to censor political material in violation of § 315 or to risk being found guilty of 
libel or defamation.104 
 
The lack of certainty as to the possible success of defenses to libel and the natural 
inclination to err on the side of caution, the Court opined, thereby either intentionally or 
unintentionally chills speech.105  Because time often is of the essence, thereby 
heightening the angst of broadcasters faced with this choice, and because of the nature of 
political campaigns and the limited time period of election seasons, a candidate and a 
broadcaster may not resolve the issue before voters take to the polls.106  Therefore, the 
holding in WDAY provides a reasonable and workable resolution of the broadcasters’ 
dilemma when presented with political speech containing defamatory material.   
 
The Court in WDAY relied on legislative history and what it concluded was 
Congress’s intended purpose of fostering public discussion of political issues and of not 
placing unreasonable burdens on broadcasters which play such an important role in the 
                                                 
100 Id.; and see Farmers v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525. 
101 Id. at 529. 
102 Id.  See also  Sorensen v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).  Sorensen v. Wood, the first judicial decision to 
address the issue of immunity from a libel suit, said that a broadcaster could delete defamatory statements 
from political speech.  Cases since Sorensen uniformly have reversed course, instead, recognizing 
broadcaster immunity from libel suits relating to the broadcast of political advertisements. 
103 Farmers v. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 529. 
104 Id. at 529-30. 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., id. at 530.   
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political process.107  The Court in WDAY, therefore, recognized immunity from 
defamation suits where a broadcaster airs a political advertisement that defames an 
opposing candidate.108  No such immunity has been recognized for the broadcast of 
indecent material contained in political advertisements.       
 
 
B. Possible Exceptions to the Political Broadcast Rules 
 
 
In 1992, the FCC and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
interpreted the indecency provisions of § 1464 to be exceptions to the reasonable access, 
censorship, and equal opportunities provisions of § 312 and § 315.109  This conclusion 
ultimately was overturned by the D.C. Circuit in Becker v. FCC.110  In the earlier cases, 
the FCC and the U.S. District Court concluded that licensees were not obligated to 
broadcast indecent political speech outside the safe harbor.111  They concluded that § 
312(a)(7) and § 315 actually override programming discretion ordinarily allowed 
licensees by the Communications Act.112  In other words, pursuant to § 312(a)(7) and § 
315, broadcasters must provide reasonable access on equal terms without censorship to 
political candidates for federal office despite the fact that the broadcaster might find the 
material in the political advertisement indecent, obscene, or profane.  Unfortunately, the 
law does not expressly provide that broadcasters may not be found liable for violation of 
                                                 
107 Id. at 528, 530, n.5, n.6.  The FCC has agreed, and legislative history supports this conclusion.   
108 Id. at 529.  The Court affirmed the conclusion of the North Dakota Supreme Court which said that 
“since power of censorship of political broadcasts is prohibited it must follow as a corollary that the 
mandate prohibiting censorship includes the privilege of immunity from liability for defamatory statements 
made by the speakers.” 
109 See, e.g., Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 762 (1992) citing 
Memorandum by FCC Staff, Jan. 6, 1984.  
110  95 F.3d at 84-85 (vacating FCC ruling in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning 
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638 (1994)). 
111 See Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599, Aug. 21, 1992 (ruling on a Petition 
for Declaratory Ruling regarding anti-abortion political advertisement, the Mass Media Bureau declines to 
rule that abortion advertisements as a class are indecent, declines to foreclose warnings to viewers 
regarding contents of political advertisements that might be harmful to children, but finds channeling of 
political advertisements that are not indecent to be in violation of reasonable access requirements); See 
Public Notice Request for Comments, In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling concerning Section 
312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297, Oct. 30, 1992, MM Docket No. 92-254, FCC 92-
486 (the Commission determined that further and comprehensive review of the issue was necessary.  
“Specifically, we seek comment on all issues concerning what, if any, right or obligation a broadcast 
licensee has to channel political advertisements that it reasonably and in good faith believes are indecent. 
We also seek comment as to whether broadcasters have any right to channel material that, while not 
indecent, may be otherwise harmful to children. In this latter respect, we specifically invite commenters to 
address the proper scope of any such right and the standard by which the Commission should evaluate the 
reasonableness of broadcasters' judgments rendered in exercising that right.”).  The FCC later affirmed the 
Mass Media Bureau’s decision that (i) the abortion imagery was not indecent under § 1464; (ii) the material 
could be psychologically damaging to children; (iii) that § 312(a)(7) does not preclude channeling; and (iv) 
that § 312(a)(7) does not violate the no censorship mandate of § 315.  See also In the Matter of Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,  9 F.C.C.R. 7638. 
112 See Becker, 95 F.3d at 82. 
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§ 1464 for the broadcast of such political advertisement featuring material ultimately 
found indecent, obscene, or profane.  This unfortunate loophole presents the dilemma 
facing broadcasters. 
 
The most important conclusion the FCC reached in rejecting the NAACP’s claim 
in response to the racist speech of J.B. Stoner was that “even if the Commission were to 
find the word ‘nigger’ to be ‘obscene’ or ‘indecent,’ in light of Section 315 we may not 
prevent a candidate from utilizing that word during his ‘use’ of a licensee’s broadcast 
facilities.”113  The Commission has not as forcefully stated this conclusion since  Stoner 
II.  This single sentence highlights the broadcaster’s dilemma.  Use of certain language is 
certain to be offensive to many of a broadcaster’s audience, and indeed to the broadcaster 
also; however, because of the right of equal opportunity to all candidates for the same 
public office and the prohibition against censorship of political advertisements by a 
broadcaster, the broadcaster, must for the sake of the political process and the rights of 
the candidate allow even the most offensive racist to use the public airwaves broadcast 
facilities to spew hate, spread discontent, and generally offend the public.  The issue of 
indecent political speech nor the conclusion suggested by the dicta in the case of J.B. 
Stoner’s advertisement, however, have ever been addressed by the courts.  The 
Commission seems to have an implicit  exception to the indecency prohibition for 
political advertisements.  Such an exception, however, never has been expressly stated. 
 
Courts and the FCC have addressed claims that certain political material is 
indecent and potentially harmful to children.114  In two 1992 U.S. Congressional races, 
Daniel Becker of Georgia and Michael Bailey of Indiana, attempting to convey their anti-
abortion stances, broadcast television campaign advertisements depicting aborted fetuses.  
The advertisements seemed specifically designed to repulse viewers and voters and to 
sink the campaigns of their pro-choice opponents.  The broadcast stations in both cases 
received numerous complaints about the gruesome images depicted over the broadcast 
airwaves.   At least one broadcaster asked the FCC to declare the advertisements indecent 
and to permit broadcasters to channel those advertisements to hours when children were 
less likely to be in the viewing audience.  The D.C. Circuit in Becker, on review of an 
FCC ruling, grappled with the question of  whether the portrayals of aborted fetal 
tissue—material that was not considered indecent—could be channeled to the safe harbor 
hours when children are less likely to be in the viewing audience.115  The court struggled 
with the tension between the competing interests of children, broadcast licensees, the 
voting public, and those of political candidates exercising their right of “access to time 
periods with the greatest audience potential.”116  The FCC had concluded earlier that the 
abortion depictions were not indecent, but that because of the potential psychological 
harm to children, § 312(a)(7) did not preclude a broadcaster from exercising its discretion 
to channel the advertisement or airing it at a time that would be less detrimental to 
                                                 
113 Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944. 
114 See, e.g., Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944-45; Mass Media Bureau Letter to Kaye Scholer, 7 F.C.C.R. at 
5599-600. 
115 95 F.3d at 77-78, 80.     
116 Becker, 95 F.3d at 80 (citing Licensee Responsibility, 47 F.C.C.2d at 517). 
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children.117  Additionally, the FCC concluded that channeling the potentially 
psychologically harmful advertisement did not violate the prohibition against censorship 
in § 315.118 
 
The D.C. Circuit stated in Becker “[w]e are faced, then, with competing 
interests—the licensee’s desire to spare children the sight of images that are not indecent 
but may nevertheless prove harmful, and the interest of a political candidate in exercising 
his statutory right of ‘access to the time periods with the greatest audience potential.’”119  
The D.C. Circuit observed that in light of this statutory conflict, the FCC has afforded 
licensees the final say in deciding in favor of children.120  The D.C. Circuit, however, 
took a different approach than did the FCC.  The D.C. Circuit found that the FCC’s 
approach “frustrated what the FCC itself had identified as Congress’s primary purpose in 
enacting section 312(a)(7); namely to ensure ‘candidates access to the time periods with 
the greatest audience potential . . . ’”121 
 
As a threshold matter, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the advertisement was not 
indecent because it did not fit the FCC’s definition.122  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit held 
in Becker that channeling of political advertisements, even those containing abortion-
related content, to the safe harbor is not permitted as such action would offend political 
broadcasting rules providing political candidates reasonable and equal access to broadcast 
outlets as well as violate laws prohibiting censorship of political speech.123  The court 
                                                 
117 See In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the 
Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7649 (finding that the depictions of aborted fetuses did not depict 
sexual or excretory organs or activities); see also 7 Letter Opinion to Mr. Daniel Becker, Becker for 
Congress, 1992, F.C.C.R. 7282, Oct. 30 (“Abortion in America:  The Real Story” (case “presents . . . 
question of whether a licensee in the absence of a Commission ruling as to whether a given political 
commercial is or is not indecent, may nonetheless channel the advertisement to the indecency safe harbor 
where it reasonably and in good faith determines that the ad is indecent. . .  Under these circumstances, and 
until the Commission provides definitive guidance, the staff believes it would not be unreasonable for the 
licensee to rely on the informal staff opinion referred to above and conclude that Section 312(a)(7) does not 
require it to air, outside the ‘safe harbor’, material that it reasonably and in good faith believes is 
indecent.”). 
118 In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications 
Act, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7649. 
119 95 F.3d at 80, (citing Licensee Responsibility, 47 F.C.C.2d at 517).  The gruesome images poses 
potentially greater psychological harm to children than would exposure to the naked body parts of living 
people. 
120 Becker, 95 F.3d at 80; In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of 
the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. at 7646. 
121 Becker, 95 F.3d at 79-80 (citing Licensee Responsibility, 47 F.C.C.2d at 517); FCC 1978 Report and 
Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1090. 
122 Becker, 95 F.3d at 80. 
123 95 F.3d at 80.  But see Gillett Communication of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 
1992), reversed and vacated by Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 
1993).  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a broadcaster injunctive and 
declaratory relief regarding the broadcast of a potentially indecent political advertisement, finding that the 
material was indecent as it described excretory activity and material.  The U.S. Court of Appeals vacated 
and remanded without opinion, letting the District Court’s decision stand.  Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85.  But 
see Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (granting 
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concluded that channeling the abortion advertisements to the safe harbor violated both § 
312(a)(7) and § 315 by “permitting content-based channeling of non-indecent political 
advertisements, thus denying qualified candidates the access to the broadcast media 
envisioned by Congress.”124  Broadcasters could not deny a candidate access to adult 
audiences just because children might be in the audience.125  In this case, the D.C. Circuit 
seems to have recognized an exception to the indecency rules for political 
advertisements.     
 
 
III. Recent Indecency Actions 
 
A number of complicated and highly politically charged issues remained 
unresolved in the indecency arena.  For example, it is unclear to what extent the FCC 
may prohibit fleeting images of nudity, fleeting sexually related or sexually suggestive 
references, and fleeting and isolated utterances of profanity.  The likelihood of such 
content appearing in a political campaign advertisement, while once unimaginable, or at 
least considered outside the bounds of public decency, clearly now has become quite 
possible. 
 
The FCC is caught in a tough position.  On the one hand, are the political 
pressures from certain constituents and concerned parents to preserve some safe radio 
spectrum for programming suitable for a young audience.  On the other hand, are those 
asserting the First Amendment who cite to the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica and 
the FCC’s longstanding policy against sanctioning fleeting expletives.126  Also 
complicating the issue is the disparate regulation of broadcast and subscription services 
and the resulting economic implications of that regulatory disparity.  Some argue that the 
omnipresence of these services to dispute the continued strict regulation of broadcast 
services.  They would argue that it seems on its face no longer to be warranted and indeed 
unfair regulation from an economic perspective. 
 
 
A. Janet Jackson and the Bare Breast:  CBS Corp. v. FCC 
 
The number of indecency complaints filed with the FCC increased exponentially 
from 1993 when there were no complaints at all to 2006 when there were 327,198, 
peaking in 2004 with a record 1,405,419 indecency complaints.127  The year 2004 marked 
                                                                                                                                                 
declaratory and injunctive relief and holding (i) that the prohibition against the broadcast of indecent 
material was an exception to the reasonable access, equal opportunities, and anti-censorship provisions; (ii) 
that the abortion advertisement was indecent; and (iii) that a broadcaster could channel the abortion 
advertisement to the safe harbor). 
124 Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85. 
125 Id. at 79-80. 
126 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Pacifica M&O, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699, ¶ 13; see also Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 07-582 (2007). 
127 These filings represented complaints about programming on television, radio, and cable; however, 
according to FCC records no Notices of Apparent Liability (“NALs”) have been issued against cable 
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the now infamous CBS live television broadcast of Super Bowl XXXVIII when during 
the halftime show featuring musical performers Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake, an 
apparent “wardrobe malfunction” resulted in Jackson’s bare breast being exposed for a 
fraction of a second.128  That fraction of a second of exposure of Jackson’s bare breast 
resulted in an “unprecedented number of complaints” to the FCC.129  
 
Upon review, the FCC found the performance indecent and issued a forfeiture in 
the amount of $550,000 against all of CBS’s twenty locally owned affiliates.130  First, the 
Commission determined that the Super Bowl XXXVIII broadcast fell within the subject 
matter scope of the FCC’s definition of indecency.131  The broadcast, which was aired 
outside the safe harbor, was found to depict “sexual or excretory organs or activities”—
the bare breast.132  On the determination of patent offensiveness, the FCC considered the 
Janet Jackson breast reveal in the context of the entire halftime show and concluded that 
the entire halftime show was patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium.133  Besides the duo performance by Jackson and 
Timberlake, the halftime show included performances by other artists who sang songs 
with sexual innuendo and who danced suggestively.134  The depiction of the nude breast 
                                                                                                                                                 
programmers.  See Table of Indecency Complaints and NALs:  1993-2006, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/Stats.html; and see Table of All Broadcast Indecency-Related Notices of 
Apparent Liability Issued by the FCC and/or the Enforcement Bureau since November 8, 1999, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/NAL.html.  
128 See e.g., Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004 
Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 19 
F.C.C.R. 19230 (2004) [hereinafter Super Bowl NAL], affirmed, Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2760 (2006) 
[hereinafter Super Bowl Forfeiture Order], affirmed, Order on Reconsideration, 21 F.C.C.R. 6653 (2006), 
[hereinafter Super Bowl Order on Reconsideration], on appeal sub nom. CBS Corp. v. FCC, No. 06-3575 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Jackson’s bare breast was on the screen for a mere nine-sixteenths of a second.  See Brief 
for Petitioners CBS Corporation, et al., CBS Corporation v. FCC, 06-3575 (3rd Cir. 2006).  CBS v. FCC, 
535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2008).  In 2009, yet another Super Bowl-related incident raised eyebrows and could 
result in FCC enforcement action.  Somewhere between ten to thirty seconds of a male pornographic video 
program  interrupted the live feed of the Super Bowl to Comcast cable customers in Tucson, Arizona.  The 
broadcaster confirmed the incident, but contended that the pornography was not included in the feed when 
it dispensed the signal to cable operators.  See Brian J. Pedersen, Super Bowl Clip ‘A Malicious Act’: Both 
Comcast, U.S. Probing How Major Broadcast Interrupted, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Tucson), Feb. 3, 2009.. 
129 Super Bowl NAL, 19 F.C.C.R. at 19231.  The actual number of complaints received by the Commission 
is in dispute, as a significant percentage of the complaints received where either duplicates or form 
complaints generated by a small number of special interest groups. 
130 At the time, the maximum indecency fine was $27,500.  The 20 CBS-owned affiliates were fined the 
maximum $27,500 for the broadcast.  The FCC reaffirmed the $550,000 forfeiture on remand.  See 
Reconsideration Order (May 31, 2006).  Super Bowl NAL, 19 F.C.C.R. at 19230, 19240, 19242 ¶¶ 1, 24, 
30; Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2775, 78, ¶¶ 28, 37.  Later in 2006, the FCC denied a 
petition for reconsideration of the case.  In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Television Licensees 
Concerning Their February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Order on 
Reconsideration (May 31, 2006).  CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
131 See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2771-72, ¶ 22. 
132 Id. at 2764-65, ¶ 9. 
133 Id. at 2765 ¶ 10. 
134 Id. at, ¶ 13.  During the performance Timberlake danced and teased one another.  Timberlake grabbed 
Jackson, rubbed against her body, and slapped her buttocks.  All the while, he pleaded with Jackson to let 
him  “rock your body . . . just let me rock you ’til the break of day.”  Then as he peeled off her brassiere I 
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was found to be graphic and explicit.135  While the agency determined that the material 
did not dwell or repeat at length on the exposure of the nude breast and was merely a 
fleeting image, the FCC concluded that “even relatively fleeting references may be found 
indecent where other factors contribute to a finding of patent offensiveness.”136 
 
As for the third factor in the test for patent offensiveness determinations, the FCC 
concluded that the skillfully choreographed routine of Jackson and Timberlake in the 
context of the entire halftime show did have the effect of titillating, pandering to, and 
shocking the viewing audience viewers who had no prior warning of what was to come 
during this performance.137  So, even though the depiction of the nude female breast was 
found to be fleeting in nature, the Commission found the other two factors used to 
determine whether broadcast material is patently offensive outweighed the lack of 
dwelling and repetition of the depiction of the nude breast.138  It was graphic, explicit, 
tending to titillate, pander, and shock.139  Thus, the material, which was aired outside the 
safe harbor, fell within the FCC’s definition of indecency and was patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.140  
 
Additionally, the FCC found that the performance aired by CBS and its affiliates 
was “willful.”141 The Commission made such a determination not because CBS 
consciously broadcast the nude breast “but because the network ‘consciously and 
deliberately failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that no actionably indecent 
material was broadcast.’” 142  CBS was found by the FCC to have failed to take 
precautions to prevent the indecent broadcast despite knowledge prior to the broadcast 
that the halftime show would include “some shocking moments.”143  CBS was found 
fully responsible, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the actions of the 
performers and the choreographer of the performance.144     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
sang “gonna have you naked by the end of this song.”  See Brief of FCC and U.S., CBS Corp. v. FCC, 06-
3575, at 10-11 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
135 Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2765-66 ¶11. 
136 Id. at 2766 ¶12 (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8009, ¶19). See also Young 
Broadcasting; Tempe Radio, Notice of Apparent Liability, 12 F.C.C.R. 21828 (Mass Media Bur. 1997) 
(forfeiture paid); LBJS Broadcasting, Notice of Apparent Liability, 13 F.C.C.R.. 20956 (Mass Media Bur. 
1998) (forfeiture paid).  But see Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; and see generally Indecency Policy Statement, 16 
F.C.C.R. 7999.. 
137 Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R., at 2766-67, ¶¶ 13-14. 
138 Id., ¶12; Super Bowl NAL, 19 F.C.C.R. at 19236, ¶ 14. 
139 Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2767, ¶14. 
140 Id.  
141 See id. at 2767-68, ¶ 15; CBS Corporation v. FCC, Brief for the Federal Communications Commission 
and the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 06-3575, 15, 38-51 
(2006).  
142 See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2767-68, ¶ 15; CBS Corporation v. FCC, Brief for the 
Federal Communications Commission and the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, 06-3575, 15, 38-51 (2006).  
143 Id. 
144 See Super Bowl Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2771-72, ¶ 22.  The Halftime Show was produced by 
MTV and was choreographed by a Jackson choreographer. 
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CBS appealed the FCC’s decision to the Third Circuit, which vacated the 
Commission’s orders and remanded for further proceedings.145  On appeal, there were 
two significant issues.  The first issue was whether the FCC acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in applying a new policy which permitted a finding that the fleeting image of 
Jackson’s nude breast was indecent and thus actionable.146  CBS argued that the 
Commission violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not providing a reasoned 
explanation for its deviation from a longstanding policy not to act on isolated or fleeting 
material.147 
 
The second issue was whether the Commission, applying theories of respondeat 
superior, vicarious liability, and the willfulness standard in the indecency statute, 
properly found CBS had violated the indecency prohibition.148  At issue was whether 
CBS intended to broadcast indecent material and whether it knew that Jackson and 
Timberlake were planning a wardrobe reveal.149   
 
Specifically, on appeal, CBS argued that:  (i) the FCC’s forfeiture order violated 
the First Amendment under Pacifica; (ii) the FCC violated its only policy of only fining 
repeated or extended presentations of indecent material; (iii) the FCC’s action violated 
due process and was arbitrary and capricious, specifically, the new standard the FCC 
currently asserts was not in place at the time of the Super Bowl, thus failing to give notice 
and thus the FCC should have vacated the forfeiture for the same reasons as it did in the 
subsequent fleeting expletive cases pursuant to its decision in the Omnibus Order;150 and 
(iv) the FCC did not measure contemporary community standards.151   
 
In response, the FCC argued that its indecency orders and rules are constitutional.  
The agency attempted to draw a distinction between the fleeting images in this case and 
its prior decisions regarding fleeting expletives.152  The Commission argued that its 
longstanding policy of restraint in acting on isolated and fleeting material was limited to 
fleeting expletives, and did not extend to the fleeting images in question during the Super 
Bowl XXXIII Halftime Show.153  Broadcasting, the Commission asserted, has only 
limited First Amendment protection and that the government’s interests are substantial, 
and the indecency rules are narrowly tailored to those interests.154  It offered concern 
                                                 
145 See Brief for Petitioners CBS Corporation, et al., CBS v. FCC, 06-3575 (3rd Cir. 2006); CBS v. FCC, 
535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
146 CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d at 171. 
147 Id. at 171; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
148 CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d at 171. 
149 Brief for Petitioners CBS Corporation, et al., CBS v. FCC, 06-3575 (3rd Cir. 2006).  Jackson and 
Timberlake both admitted that CBS and MTV knew nothing about their planned performance and that the 
stunt unfortunately just went terribly wrong from what they had planned. 
150 See generally Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664; and see Brief for Petitioners CBS Corporation, et al., 
CBS v. FCC,  06-3575 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
151 Brief for Petitioners CBS Corporation, et al., CBS v. FCC, 06-3575 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
152 CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d at 183-84. 
153 Brief for Federal Communications Commission and United States, CBS v. FCC, 06-3575(3rd Cir. 2006). 
154 Id. 
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about subjecting viewers to the “first blow” of indecent material as an explanation for its 
change of policy regarding fleeting material.155 
 
The Third Circuit ruled against the FCC.  The Third Circuit found that the FCC’s 
departure from its policy excepting fleeting material from the scope of its indecency 
action, acted arbitrarily and capriciously.156   While not foreclosing declaratory action, 
the court made clear that the FCC may not penalize CBS retroactively under this new rule 
which it had adopted in the later decided Golden Globes case.157  Such loss by the FCC in 
the Third Circuit was not unexpected particularly in light of what appears to be a growing 
body of law seriously questioning the FCC’s policies regarding incidences of isolated and 
fleeting indecency.158  The FCC has petitioned the U.S. Supreme court for certiorari but 
has asked the Court to hold the petition in abeyance pending the Court’s decision in FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.159 
 
 
B. Fleeting Expletives 
 
 
 1. 2003 “Golden Globe Awards”  
 
In 2003, musician Bono, upon learning that he had been awarded a Golden Globe, 
exclaimed on a live National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (“NBC”) broadcast that his 
recognition was “really, really fucking brilliant. Really, really, great.”160   The FCC’s 
Enforcement Bureau denied the numerous complaints received in response to the 
broadcast on the grounds that Bono’s utterance of the word “fucking” was isolated and 
fleeting.161  The Enforcement Bureau concluded that in this case use of the word 
“fucking” did not refer to a sexual act, but was used more as a modifier similar to using a 
term like “extremely” or “really.”162  The Enforcement Bureau concluded, therefore, that 
                                                 
155 See FCC Petition for Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., at 10 (2007). 
156 CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d at 171.  Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the FCC could not impose 
liability on CBS for the acts of Jackson and Timberlake “under the proper application of vicarious liability 
and in light of the First Amendment requirement that the content of speech or expression not be penalized 
absent a showing of scienter.” 
157 CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d at 178-81. 
158 See generally CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167  (3rd Cir. 2008); see also Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 
489 F.3d 444, cert. granted FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 
(2008). 
159 See John Eggerton, FCC, DOJ Appeal Janet Jackson to Supreme Court, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 
21, 2008. 
160 Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe 
Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859 (2003) [hereinafter Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes Decision].  
In 2009, the FCC received a new round of indecency complaints about NBC’s live broadcast of the 2009 
Golden Globes during which a movie director gave the finger to actor Mickey Rourke who was on stage 
accepting an award.  See BROADCAST COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Jan. 21, 2009; BROADCAST 
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Jan. 14, 2009.  The Commission now must grapple with the question of whether 
the gesture could be considered indecent.  Id. 
161 Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes Decision , 18 F.C.C.R. at 19860-61, ¶ ¶5-6. 
162 Id. 
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the speech was not indecent as defined by the Commission and as supported by a long 
line of FCC policy regarding fleeting uses of such language.163 
 
Despite the action by the Enforcement Bureau and the agency’s own long 
established policy reaffirming that fleeting expletives uttered on broadcast stations would 
not be actionable, the full Commission overturned the ruling of the bureau, concluding 
that the utterance, while admittedly fleeting was now considered profane and indecent 
and patently offensive under contemporary community standards.164  The Commission 
explained that the word “fuck” and all variations of it, however they are used, have a 
sexual connotation.165  It stated further that “the ‘F-Word’ is one of the most vulgar, 
graphic, and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language” insinuating 
that all uses of it describes sexual activity even if not used literally so.166  Declining to 
sanction NBC in this particular instance because utterances of fleeting expletives were 
not actionable at the time Bono uttered them on live television, the Commission, 
nevertheless, warned all broadcast licensees that the Commission would consider any 
future use of the “F-word” and all variations of it, even as an “intensifier” or modifier, to 
be indecent and profane and thus actionable.167 
 
NBC and other broadcasters filed petitions for reconsideration and a petition to 
stay the FCC’s order.168  To date, the FCC has not acted on these petitions, but has 
applied the policy adopted in the Golden Globes Order to subsequent cases.169  
 
 
 2. Other Broadcasts of Fleeting Expletives 
 
In 2006, the FCC consolidated into one order a response to four other complaints 
against various licensees for the following broadcasts:  (i) Fox’s “2002 Billboard Music 
Awards” in which entertainer Cher stated “I’ve also had critics for the last 40 years 
saying that I was on my way out every year.  Right.  So fuck ‘em.  I still have a job and 
they don’t.”; (ii) Fox’s “2003 Billboard Music Awards” during which presenter, Nicole 
Richie, stated “Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse?  It’s not so 
fucking simple.”; (iii) several episodes of the ABC network’s weekly hour-long police 
drama “NYPD Blue” which contained the words “bullshit,” “dick,” and “dickhead”; and 
(iv) the CBS network’s “The Early Show” where a guest during a live morning interview 
used the word “bullshitter.”170 
                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979-81, ¶¶ 9, 13 (“While prior Commission and staff action have 
indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or would not 
be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer 
good law.”).  
165 Id. 
166 Id. at ¶ 9. 
167 Id. at ¶ ¶15-17. 
168 Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc., FCC v. Fox Televisions, Inc., 07-582, at 7 (Feb. 1, 2008). 
169 Id.; Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975; and see Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2667, ¶ 12; 
Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 133301,13304-05, ¶¶ 7, 16. 
170 Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at  2690-93, 2696, 2698-99 ¶¶ 101, 112 n. 164, 125, 137. 
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The FCC found each of these broadcasts indecent and profane under the new 
policy it adopted in the Golden Globes Order.171  Using the same analysis it used in the 
Golden Globes Order, the Commission stated again that any use of any variation of the 
word “fuck” is presumed indecent and profane.172  Similarly, any use of “shit” also is 
presumptively indecent and profane.173  Additionally, the broadcasts were found explicit, 
shocking, and gratuitous, and thus, patently offensive.174  Again, the Commission 
declined to issue a forfeiture because the utterances were made when the old policy that 
isolated fleeting expletives were not indecent or profane was applicable.175  Because of 
this, the FCC concluded that the broadcasters did not have adequate notice of the new 
policy regarding the broadcast of fleeting or isolated expletives.176   
 
Fox, CBS, and ABC filed petitions for review of the order.177  On voluntary 60-
day remand, the FCC issued a new order, the Omnibus Remand Order, addressing these 
four incidents.178  Rejecting arguments opposing sanctioning isolated and fleeting 
utterances, the Omnibus Remand Order vacated in substantial part the Omnibus Order.179 
The FCC reaffirmed its holding that both the 2002 and 2003 Fox Billboard Music 
Awards shows contained indecent and profane material.180  The “NYPD Blue” forfeiture 
was vacated on procedural grounds and the complaint against ABC was dismissed.181 
 
The Commission reversed its decision regarding “The Early Show” broadcast.182  
The Commission concluded that because the use of the word “bullshitter” on “The Early 
Show” occurred during a “bona fide news interview,” it was not subject to forfeiture.183  
                                                 
171 Id. at 2698-99, ¶ 137, § III.B; Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975.   
172 Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at  ______, ¶¶ 81, 102, 107; Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975. 
173 Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at _______, ¶¶ 81, 125-127, 138, 143.  The Commission did not consider 
utterances of the word “dick” and its derivative “dickhead” in the context they were presented to be 
patently offensive.  The terms were not used to describe a sexual organ but rather to denigrate another 
person.  Therefore, the use of “dick” and “dickhead” were not found to be indecent.  The Commission, 
however, found use of the word “shit” to be patently offensive as measured by community standards, and 
thus indecent. 
174 Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2691, 2694, 2697, 2699, ¶¶ 106, 120, 131, 141. 
175 Id. at 2692, 2695, 2698, 2700, ¶¶ 111, 124, 136, 145. 
176 Id. at 2700 ¶ 145. 
177 Fox and CBS filed a petition in the Second Circuit.   ABC Television Network (“ABC”) and Hearst-
Argyle Television, Inc. (“Hearst”) filed a joint petition for review in the D.C. Circuit.  The Second Circuit 
which granted Fox’s motion to consolidate these cases. 
178 See generally Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at _13299.  
179 Id at 13302, ¶ 11. 
180 Id. at 13325, ¶ 63. 
181 Id. at 13328, ¶ 74. 
182 Id. at 13328, ¶ 73. 
183 Id. at 13327, ¶ 71 (“There is no outright news exemption from our indecency rules.”); Indecency Policy 
Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002-03.  It relied on its Indecency Statement which suggests that context is 
important and that “[e]xplicit language in the context of a bona fide newscast might not be patently 
offensive.”  Although the FCC has never recognized a formal exception in the indecency rules for “bona 
fide news interviews”, the Commission seemed to excuse the use of the term in that instance.  The 
Commission, however, has never said, nor did it say in the case of “The Early Show” that it would never 
act on indecent material presented in a bona fide news context. 
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Although the FCC has never recognized a formal exception in the indecency rules for 
“bona fide news interviews,” the Commission seemed to excuse the use of the term 
“bullshitter” in that instance.184  The Commission, however, has never said, nor did it say 
in the case of “The Early Show” that it would never act on indecent material presented in 
a bona fide news context.  Along the same vein, the FCC has never said that it would 
never act in the political advertisement context either.      
 
The Omnibus Remand Order was appealed to the Second Circuit.185  On appeal, 
the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the FCC’s decision to the Commission for 
further proceedings.186  The Second Circuit found that the agency’s new policy on 
fleeting expletives “represents a significant departure from positions previously taken by 
the agency and relied on by the broadcast industry.”187  The court also found that the 
FCC’s new policy was arbitrary and capricious, the agency having failed to provide a 
reasoned basis for the policy change.188 
 
The Second Circuit recognized that federal agencies may revise their rules and 
policies as they find appropriate, but that such agency rule and policy changes must be 
supported by a “reasoned explanation” of why the new rule or policy is better than the old 
rule or policy.189  The court concluded that the Commission failed to offer such a 
reasoned explanation for its new policies on either fleeting expletives or profanity.190  
Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected the FCC’s argument that fleeting expletives must 
not be exempted from a finding of indecency because to do so would “unfairly force[] 
viewers (including children) to take ‘the first blow’” referred to by the Court in 
Pacifica.191  The Court in Pacifica made it clear that it was not offering an opinion on 
fleeting utterances of profanity.192 
 
The Second Circuit struggled to reconcile the Commission’s nearly thirty years of 
acquiescence to the problem of the proverbial “first blow” with its newfound concern 
about fleeting expletives.193  Specifically, the Second Circuit found that the FCC did not 
provide a “reasonable explanation for why it has changed its perception that a fleeting 
                                                 
184 Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at  ¶ 71.  
185 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444.   
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 447.  In 2001, the Commission attempted to provide broadcasters with guidance on its indecency 
enforcement policy.  The Commission excepted fleeting and fleeting expletives and sexual references from 
indecency enforcement action.  The agency also stressed the importance of taking potentially indecent 
material in proper context.  Indecency Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8016-17, ¶ 30. 
188 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 447. 
189 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 456-57. 
190 Id. at  460-62. 
191 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309, ¶ 25.  The first blow analogy 
suggests that while a listener or viewer may elect to turn off the television or radio or switch the channel 
after hearing offensive language, listeners and viewers should not have to be subjected to this proverbial 
“first blow,” but that FCC rules may prohibit the utterance or depiction of indecent, profane, or obscene 
material altogether.  In doing so, viewers and listeners are spared suffering the needless first blow. 
192 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
193 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 457-58.  The Court in Pacifica rejected the argument that “one may avoid 
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language.”  438 U.S. at 748-49. 
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expletive was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for the nearly thirty years between Pacifica and 
Golden Globes.”194  The court found that the FCC failed to produce any evidence that a 
fleeting expletive is harmful.  Additionally, the exceptions the Commission seemed to 
carve out appear to undercut its concerns about the “first blow.”  The Commission’s 
treatment of the material presented in “The Early Show” as excusable because it appeared 
in a bona fide news interview, as well as its excuse of the expletives that were considered 
“integral” to a work, such as those that appeared in the movies “Saving Private” and 
“Schindler's’ List”,  indeed forced viewers to take the first blow.195  The Second Circuit 
found that the FCC failed to support its “first blow” theory in light of these gaping 
holes.196  Because the FCC did not prohibit the broadcast of all expletives, the court could 
not find support for this new policy.197  The court also disagreed with the FCC’s 
conclusion that the “F-word” has an inescapable sexual connotation, pointing out that the 
word often is used in casual daily conversation without a sexual meaning.198  This case 
has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has 
granted the FCC’s and U.S. government’s Petition for Certiorari.199 
 
 
3. Supreme Court Appeal 
 
The issue on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is “[w]hether the court of appeals 
erred in striking down the FCC’s determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives 
may violate federal restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language,’ even when the uttered expletives are not repeated.”200 
 
                                                 
194 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 457-58; Pacifica 438 U.S. 726; Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975. 
195 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458-59.  In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding 
Their Broadcast of "Saving Private Ryan," 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4512-13 ¶¶ 13, 14 (Feb. 3, 2005).  “Saving 
Private Ryan” is a dramatic movie about combat soldiers in World War II.  “Schindler’s List” is a drama 
based on the real life experiences of a German businessman and Jews enslaved by Nazis during World War 
II. 
196 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458-59. 
197 Id. at  456-57 .  The Second Circuit did acknowledge the warning in Pacifica that a total ban on 
expletives would raise significant constitutional questions.  
198 Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 456-57. 
199 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2008). 
200 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 
2d 352, 07-582 (2008); and see 18 U.S.C. 1464 (2006); see 47 C.F.R. 73.3999 (2006).  Respondents Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. have framed the issue as “[w]hether the court of appeals correctly held as a matter 
of administrative law that the FCC failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversing its longstanding 
indecency enforcement policy with respect to isolated and fleeting expletives.”  Brief in Opposition of 
Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc, and ABC, Inc., FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008).  Respondent NBC Universal, Inc. and 
NBC Telemundo License Company frame the issue as “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in holding that 
the Commission had failed to explain adequately the abrupt reversal of its longstanding determination that 
fleeting and isolated utterances of expletives generally fall outside the Commission’s definition of 
broadcast indecency.”  Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License 
Company, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008).  
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Petitioners, FCC and the U.S. government, have argued that the Second Circuit’s 
opinion conflicts with the Court’s holding in Pacifica.201  Petitioners seem to concede 
that pursuant to Pacifica and Commission decisions, when “a complaint focuses solely on 
the use of expletives, . . . repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a 
finding of indecency.”202  But, they contend, when offensive language involves not just 
expletives, but describes sexual or excretory functions “repetition of specific words or 
phrases is not necessarily an element critical to a determination of indecency.”203  The 
Commission, it argues, has established that determinations of patent offensiveness are 
fact-specific.204  In determining whether material is patently offensive, it will consider the 
“full context” of the broadcast.205  The Commission claims in its Petition for Certiorari, 
therefore, that even fleeting references may be found indecent if other factors such as 
graphic language or explicit language “contributing to a finding of patent offensiveness” 
are present.206 
 
Petitioners argue that the Second Circuit imposed “hurdles” in supporting its 
changed policy that “find no support in the Administrative Procedure Act.”207  Petitioners 
argue that the agency must continually review its policies and that it may make policy 
changes where “prior polic[ies] failed to implement properly the statute.”208  The failure 
the agency alleges is the drawing of an “artificial distinction” between expletives and 
descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory activity despite the fact that “an 
expletive’s power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.”209 
 
At the heart of Respondents’ argument is that the Administrative Procedure Act 
requires that the FCC justify, by a more reasoned explanation, the decision to change a 
30-year old policy not to consider fleeting expletives to fall within the definition of 
indecency.210  Respondents, seeking to uphold the Second Circuit’s decision, have 
argued, first, that there is no conflict between the Second Circuit’s decision and 
                                                 
201 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 
352, 07-582 (2008). 
202 2. F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶ 13 (Apr. 16, 1987). 
203 Pacifica M&O, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699 ¶ 13. 
204 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 
352, 07-582 (2008). 
205 Indecency Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002-03, ¶ 19. 
206 Id. at 8008-09, ¶¶ 17, 19; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582, at 5 (2008). 
207 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 
352, 07-582, at 21 (2008);  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
208 FCC Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 
2d 352, 07-582, at 22 (2008) citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991). 
209 Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at ¶ 23. 
210 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc, and ABC, 
Inc., 07-582 (2008); Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Company, 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008), citing NCTA v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981. 
(2005). 
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Pacifica.211  Second, respondents argue that the Second Circuit’s decision is consistent 
with administrative law principles and other precedent including ACT III.212  Finally, they 
argue that the Second Circuit’s remand to the FCC does not warrant the Court’s 
review.213   
 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court saw the possibility of such a dilemma in FCC v. 
Fox.214  The Court’s decision in the fleeting expletives case may better define what 
constitutes indecent material and the extent to which fleeting images or other isolated 
sexual content in political campaign advertisements like those in the recent political 
advertisements actually triggers the statutory conflict in question here. 
 




                                                 
211 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc, and ABC, 
Inc., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008); Brief in 
Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Company, FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008). 
212 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc, and ABC, 
Inc., 07-582 (2008); Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Company, 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008); ACT III, 58 F.3d 
654.  In ACT III, the D.C. Circuit rejected arguments that the FCC’s indecency definition was vague and 
overbroad.  58 F.3d 654 (1995).  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s policy of channeling 
indecent material to the safe harbor, but disagreed with the disparate application of the safe harbor to 
stations that signed off at or before midnight and all other broadcast stations.  The court, therefore, directed 
the FCC’s to enlarge the safe harbor hours to include the hours from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. instead of 
midnight to 6:00 a.m.  The D.C. Circuit in earlier cases ACT I,  852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ( breadth, 
vagueness, delineation of safe harbor hours; sides with FCC), and ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 
cert denied 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) (requests review of FCC order issued in compliance with law 
prohibiting indecent material 24 hours per day.  Court says indecent material afforded First Amendment 
protection as long as channeled but obscene material is not protected), had also upheld the indecency 
definition.  ACT II vacated a complete ban on indecent material.  The D.C. Circuit in ACT III, held that 
scientific evidence of harm to children was not necessary to show a compelling governmental interest.  
ACT III dealt with pornographic material, not fleeting expletives. 
213 Respondents also argue that the Commission’s definition of indecency is unconstitutionally vague 
tending to chill large amounts of speech, citing the lenient standard applied in the Saving Private Ryan case 
in which the Commission was deferential to the artistic freedom of the filmmaker and the subject matter 
which was war and contrasting that with the lack of deference shown the filmmaker in a documentary about 
blues music.  In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast of 
“Saving Private Ryan,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4512-13, ¶¶ 12-14 (Feb. 28, 2005).  Brief in Opposition of 
Respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc, and ABC, Inc., FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008); and see Brief in Opposition of NBC 
Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Company, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 128 S. Ct. 
1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352, 07-582 (2008).  In 1997, the Court struck down a similar indecency standard in 
the Communications Decency Act.  The Court found the standard unconstitutionally vague.  See Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
214 See Transcript of U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument in FCC v. Fox (Nov. 4, 2008. 
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C. Nudity and Other Crass Behavior on Television’s “NYPD Blue”, 
“Married By America”, and “Without A Trace” 
 
 
1. “NYPD Blue” 
 
On February 19, 2008, the Federal Communications Commission issued a 
Forfeiture Order against the ABC Television Network and certain affiliated stations 
issuing a fine in the amount of $27,500.215  The NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order sanctioned 
ABC’s 9:00 p.m. broadcast of an episode of the police drama which depicted a woman’s 
naked buttocks and a portion of her naked breast.  In the scene, the woman’s naked body 
was shown while she was taking a shower and as an eight-year old boy looked on.  The 
female’s naked body parts were not obscured, blurred, or pixulated.216  The FCC cited the 
repeated shots of the woman’s naked buttocks and the deliberate panning of the camera 
down her back “to reveal another full view of her buttocks before panning up again” to 
create a “voyeuristic” vantage point.217  The FCC also cited another camera shot in which 
the young boy’s shocked face is depicted from between the naked woman’s legs.218 
 
In its NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order the Commission affirmed its earlier decisions 
and concluded that the depiction of the naked female buttocks in the “NYPD Blue” 
episode squarely came within the subject matter scope of its indecency definition in that 
it described or depicted sexual or excretory organs or activities.219  Despite the fact that 
the buttocks is not necessarily biologically an excretory organ, the FCC has consistently 
concluded that it is an excretory organ for the purposes of satisfying its indecency 
definition.220  The FCC stated in the NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order that “the buttocks, 
which, though not physiologically necessary to procreation or excretion, are widely 
associated with sexual arousal and closely associated by most people with excretory 
activities.”221 
                                                 
215 In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 25, 2003 
Broadcast of the Program “NYPD Blue”, 23 F.C.C.R. 3147 (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter NYPD Blue 
Forfeiture Order], ¶¶ 52-53.  The FCC imposed the fine only on those ABC affiliates about which the 
agency had received complaints resulting from the broadcast of the material outside the safe harbor.  The 
FCC previously had issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture in the case.  In the Matter of 
Complaints Against Various Television, Licensees Concerning Their February 25, 2003 Broadcast of the 
Program “NYPD Blue”, 23 F.C.C.R. 1596 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter NYPD Blue NAL]. 
216 NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, 23 F.C.C.R. at 3152, ¶ 13.  Pixulation is a popular method used to distort 
the resolution of an image in order to obscure it. 
217 Id. at 3153-54, ¶ 16. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 3149-50, ¶ 7. 
220 Id. at 3150, ¶ 8. n. 28 citing Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2681 ¶ 62, 2718 ¶ 225 (finding buttocks are 
sexual and excretory organs within the definition of indecency); Entercom Kansas City License, LLC, 
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 19 F.C.C.R. 25011 ¶ 7 (2004) (comments about genitals, 
buttocks, and breasts); Rubber City Radio Group, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 17 F.C.C.R. 
14745, 14747 ¶ 6 (Enf. Bur. 2002) (comments about a “baby’s ass”). 
221 NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, 23 F.C.C.R. at 3150, ¶ 8. n. 28  citing Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 
2681 ¶ 62, 2718 ¶ 225 (finding buttocks are sexual and excretory organs within the definition of 
indecency); Entercom Kansas City License, LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 19 F.C.C.R. 
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Reviewing the context of the material in the episode and whether the material was 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, the FCC 
concluded that “notwithstanding any artistic or social merit and the presence of a parental 
advisory and ration, the material was patently offensive under the community standards 
for the broadcast medium.”222  In reaching this conclusion, the FCC first determined that 
the depiction of the naked buttocks in this case was sufficiently graphic and explicit to 
support a finding of indecency.223 
 
Next, the FCC also found that the repeated camera shots of the woman’s naked 
buttocks, while not as egregious as some cases the agency had reviewed, certainly 
rendered the episode more offensive than many cases the Commission had previously 
found not of patently offensive.224  The FCC acknowledged that the depiction in the 
“NYPD Blue” episode was not as lengthy or as repetitive as some indecency cases where 
there had been a finding of patent offensiveness, but that it did contain “lengthier 
depictions of nudity, or more focus on nudity, than other cases involving nudity where 
the Commission has found that this factor did not weigh in favor of a finding of patent 
offensiveness.”225  Finally, in applying the third factor in determining whether material is 
patently offensive, the FCC concluded that the scene was pandering, titillating and 
shocking because of the voyeuristic camera shots that panned up and down the back of 
the woman’s naked body.226  This case has been appealed to the Second Circuit.227 
 
 
2. “Married By America” 
 
On February 22, 2008, the Federal Communications Commission issued a 
Forfeiture Order against a number of Fox Television Network affiliated stations for the 
broadcast of the reality show “Married By America.”228  The forfeiture, in the amount of 
$7,000 per station, sanctioned Fox’s broadcast prior to 10:00 p.m. of the reality show 
featuring bachelor and bachelorette parties for two couples all of whom prior to the show 
                                                                                                                                                 
25011 ¶ 7 (2004) (comments about genitals, buttocks, and breasts); Rubber City Radio Group, Notice of 
Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 17 F.C.C.R. 14745, 14747 ¶ 6 (Enf. Bur. 2002) (comments about a 
“baby’s ass”).  
222 NYPD Blue Forfeiture Order, 23 F.C.C.R. at 3155, ¶ 18.   
223 Id. at 3152, ¶ 13. 
224 Id. at 3153, ¶ 15. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 ABC v. FCC, _______ (2nd Cir.2008). 
228 In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast of the Fox 
Television Network Program “Married By America” on April 7, 2003, 23 F.C.C.R. 3222 (Feb. 22, 2008) 
[hereinafter Married By America Forfeiture Order].  A Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture had 
been issued previously on October 12, 2004. In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Licensees 
Regarding Their Broadcast Of The Fox Television Network Program “Married By America” On April 7, 
2003, 19 F.C.C.R. 20191 [hereinafter Married By America NAL].  The Enforcement Bureau denied a 
petition for reconsideration.  In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their 
Broadcast of the Fox Television Network Program “Married By America” on April 7, 2003, 23 F.C.C.R. 
5699 (Apr. 4, 2008). 
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were strangers, but whom America by vote paired to be married on the show.  The 
bachelor and bachelorette parties for the couples featured “sexually oriented” and 
suggestive performances by male and female strippers.229 
 
The various scenes cited by the FCC in its Married By America Forfeiture Order 
included depictions of nude and semi-nude female and male adult entertainers grinding 
their crotches with partygoers, smearing and licking whipped cream from various body 
parts, seductively kissing breasts and other body parts, spanking partygoers with whips 
and belts, providing suggestive and seductive lap dances, and engaging in other sexually 
suggestive behavior.230  The FCC concluded that the depictions, many of which were 
pixulated to obscure naked body parts such as buttocks, breasts, and genitals, were 
designed “to stimulate sexual arousal.”231  The Commission found the material 
“sufficiently graphic and explicit to support an indecency finding.” 232  In the Forfeiture 
Order, the FCC stated that the fact that naked body parts were pixulated “did not obscure 
the overall graphic character of the depiction” and determined that the material should be 
assessed “in its full context.”233 
 
Fox refused to pay the $91,000 forfeiture, which has been reduced from the nearly 
$1.2 million originally imposed, and asked the Commission for reconsideration.234  
Borrowing language from the court of appeals, Fox called the fine “arbitrary and 
capricious, inconsistent with precedent, and patently unconstitutional.”235  The FCC 
refused to reconsider on procedural grounds.236  The U.S. Department of Justice has 
weighed in, filing suit in the D.C. Circuit, the Southern District of Iowa, the Southern 
District of West Virginia, and the Middle District of Tennessee against eight Fox 
affiliates to recover the $7,000 forfeiture against each.237  The resolution of these cases 




3. “Without A Trace” 
 
                                                 
229
Married By America Forfeiture Order, 23 F.C.C.R. at 3223, ¶ 2. 
230 Id. at 3324,27, ¶¶ 7-14. 
231 Id. at 3326, ¶ 12. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Fox press release 3/24/08.  See also Frank Ahrens, Fox Refuses to Pay FCC Indecency Fine, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 25, 2008, at D01 The $91,000 forfeiture was to be paid by March 22, 2008.  Upon receipt of a 
forfeiture, licensees generally have two options available:  (i) pay and appeal the fine or (ii) do not pay the 
fine and later mount a defense in a trial de novo should the government seek to collect the amount of the 
forfeiture. 
235 See id. 
236 See In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast of the Fox 
Television Network Program “Married By America” on April 7, 2003, 23 F.C.C.R. 5699 (Apr. 4, 2008) 
(FCC Enforcement Bureau). 
237 See John Eggerton, FCC Kicks Back Fox's Married by America Appeal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 
4, 2008. 
238 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 (Apr. 4, 2008). 
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In 2006, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture against 
numerous CBS network affiliates for the December 31, 2004 broadcast of an episode of 
“Without A Trace” which depicted teenagers engaged in sex acts.239  The episode 
involved an FBI investigation into the disappearance and rape of a high school student.240  
In a flashback scene, viewers were taken back to the scene of a teenage sex party that 
included depictions of couples and groups of teenagers engaged in various sex acts.241  
There was no actual nudity, but teenagers were depicted partially unclothed.  The scene 
depicted intercourse between the teenagers.242  The final scene in the flashback depicted 
the victim in a bra and panties straddling a male.243  Two other males were kissing her 
breast and the victim was moving up and down on the male who was shown thrusting his 
hips into the victim’s crotch.244 
 
Even though there was no actual nudity, the FCC concluded that the depiction of 
sexual activity was shocking, intended to titillate, and patently offensive under 
contemporary community standards.245  The FCC proposed a fine totaling $3,607,500 
against the CBS affiliates.246  This case has been appealed to the Second Circuit.247  
 
 




A. The Advertisements While Offensive Do Not Meet the Definition of 
Indecency 
 
While the anti-Ford and the anti-Arcuri advertisements are offensive, racist, 
and/or sexually suggestive, neither advertisements is indecent, obscene or profane as 
defined by statutory and regulatory law.  Neither the anti-Ford nor the anti-Arcuri 
advertisements describes or depicts sexual or excretory organs or activities.  The 
depiction in the anti-Ford advertisement presents a suggestion of nudity but no actual 
depiction of sexual or excretory organs.  Only the bare shoulders of the young blonde 
woman are shown on camera.  While the anti-Arcuri advertisement shows a stripper 
appearing to give a suggestive dance performance, only the woman’s silhouette is 
depicted on camera, and she is not engaged in any actual sex act.   
                                                 
239 Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their December 31, 2004 Broadcast of 
the Program “Without A Trace”, 21 F.C.C.R. 2732 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Without A Trace NAL]. 
240 Id. at 2735, ¶ 11. 




245 Id. at 2736, ¶ 16. 
246 Id. at 2759 (Attachment A).  The Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture later was cancelled against 
eight licensees.  See In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their 
December 31, 2004 Broadcast of the Program “Without A Trace”, 21 F.C.C.R. 3110 (FCC Enforcement 
Bureau) (2006).   
247 See CBS v. FCC, ___________ (2nd Cir. 2008). 
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Consequently, they do not fall neatly within the context of the FCC’s indecency 
definition.  Additionally, even were they found to be indecent, they very well could be 
found to be fleeting and isolated indecent material, the actionability of which will turn on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the fleeting expletive cases.  These advertisements, 
however, are precursors to future political speech that might fall within that definition.  
Not satisfying the definition of indecency, the FCC could not sanction a licensee who 
decided to broadcast either of these advertisements.  The advertisements admittedly do no 
present broadcasters the exact legal dilemma contemplated by scholars and courts, but 
they definitely signal a shift in that direction.  It likely is only a matter of time before 
broadcasters face the situation that will force them to make this tough choice between 
competing statutory obligations. 
 
 
B. Patent Offensiveness in Context and as Measured by the Community 
Standard 
 
 Assuming for a moment that the advertisements were deemed indecent and for the 
sake of argument, however, the second part of an indecency analysis should be 
considered.  As discussed above, determinations of whether broadcast material is 
indecent “[are] largely a function of context.”248  Context was taken into consideration 
when Bono used the expletive to describe just how happy he was to receive a Golden 
Globe award.  Context was considered in the Janet Jackson, Justin Timberlake Super 
Bowl XXXVIII performance.  Therefore, the context in which the anti-Ford and anti-
Arcuri advertisements arose also must be considered. 
 
In this case, the context obviously is the political process and specifically a 
political campaign for a United States political office.  While public opinion of politicians 
often is less than laudatory, the public’s disappointment with the conduct of politicians is 
grounded in the notion that on a certain level we hold them to a higher standard as 
administrators of the public trust.  While we understand that politics can be dirty 
business, the mudslinging in political advertisements historically has been contained to 
casting aspersions on an opponent’s character in the form of attacks on their political, 
social, and economic policies.  Because of technological advances—namely the 
popularity of 24-hour news programming and the public’s greater access to information 
provided by citizen journalists on Internet websites—what used to be behind-closed-door, 
private, and personal matters have now become much more public and widely available 
for considerable public consumption.249  No matter how inappropriate a forum the 
political campaign arena for gratuitous, titillating, and suggestive sexual speech, 
candidates and politicians do continually seem to be caught up in scandal involving 
sexual misconduct that in some cases does have some bearing on their suitability for 
public office. 
 
                                                 
248
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. 
249 Michael Wolff, supra at note 19. 
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1. The Material is Not Explicit or Graphic 
 
The material in the anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri advertisements is not explicit or 
graphic.  As discussed above, there is no actual nudity or any depiction of explicit or 
graphic sexual activity. 
 
 
2. The Images Are Fleeting and Do Not Dwell or Repeat at Length 
 
The material in the anti-Ford advertisement does not dwell or repeat at length 
descriptions of sexual organs or activities.  The image, although repeated once, does not 
do so at length.  The image of the woman with bare shoulders appears on the screen only 
for a few seconds. An argument could be made that the material in the anti-Arcuri 
advertisement does dwell at length on the image of the woman appearing to perform an 




3. The Material is Not Intended to Pander, Titillate, or Shock 
 
The anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri advertisements do pander, titillate, and arouse 
viewers.  They are intended to and do arouse our racial prejudices, fears, and willingness 
to stereotype.  In that way they are just as, if not more, harmful to children, the political 
process, and society at large as any sexual content currently being broadcast because they 
and advertisements like them are presented in a serious context with the intent of 
confusing an already media-overwhelmed and saturated electorate.  While the depictions 
in both the anti-Ford and anti-Arcuri advertisements are offensive and gratuitous, they, 
however, probably were not intended to pander, titillate, or arouse the viewers in a sexual 
manner.  Instead, they were intended to taint the image both of Ford and Arcuri as well as 
their chances of victory respectively, and in the case of the anti-Ford advertisement, to 
evoke racial images and prejudicial thoughts against Ford. 
 
 Television content in general has become much racier.  Additionally, sexually 
suggestive material is commonplace on broadcast, cable, and satellite television as well 
as on the Internet, particularly when websites such as YouTube250, MySpace, and 
Facebook251 are factored into the analysis.252  The bar has been set very low.  Compared 
to regularly scheduled primetime programming, today’s political advertisements still 
probably would be considered appropriate for general audiences including children, from 
an indecency perspective.  The regular prime time line up on the big four broadcast 
                                                 
250 Available at http://youtube.com. 
251 MySpace and Facebook are social networking websites that allow users to post photographs, videos, and  
various personal information.  These websites are available at http://myspace.com and http://facebook.com, 
respectively. 
252 The CBS network will air a racy program titled “Swingtown” during Summer, 2008.  The show will 
feature the lives of adults who engage in the “swinger” lifestyle which involves having sex with multiple 
partners.  Groups like the Parents Television Council already are voicing opposition to the program. 
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networks, on the other hand, provides a steady diet of sex, violence, and generally base 
programming.  Programming on cable generally is even more permissive particularly 
when the excessive drinking and sexually suggestive material commonplace in many 
reality shows is factored in.253   
 
The race to the bottom with respect to the quality of television programming also 
might reflect a growing tolerance in American society for the crass, suggestive, and base  
material streamed into our households every minute of every day.  There is, after all, no 
huge ground swell of public outrage.  The majority of indecency complaints received by 
the FCC in recent years have originated from one watchdog organization, the Parents 
Television Council.254   
 
Americans, in large part, seem to have become desensitized to sexualized material 
on television.  Advertisements for condoms, breast enlargement, erectile dysfunction 
medications, other products touting the ability to enhance intimate satisfaction can be 
seen on television all day long, even during times of the day when children are very 
likely to be in the viewing audience.  The number of sex scandals involving public 
figures and the 24-hour news coverage of them has brought the language of sex to a 
prominent place in contemporary news coverage.  This material routinely crawls across 
the bottom of the television screen on morning news television programs.  The details of 
the alleged sex acts are openly discussed at all times of the day by television newscasters.  
Due to our exposure to crass and coarse television programming, the American public in 
many ways has developed immunity to this type of material that has invaded the homes 
and the minds of all viewers, not just children.  FCC policy, however, historically has 
been highly protective of children seeking to shield them from the potentially harmful 
effects of excessive sexual content in broadcast radio and television programming.  When 
the broader availability of and subscription to cable, satellite, and high-speed Internet 
services is factored in, our collective resistance to indecent material becomes even more 
evident. 
 
On the other hand, with this desensitization comes the fear that the American 
public has lost the ability to be discerning regarding indecent material.  Additionally, the 
fact that the political advertisements in question are aired by an increasingly consolidated 
and corporate-controlled media must factor into this analysis.  Consolidation in the news 
industry has resulted in fewer traditional sources and outlets distributing what historically 
have been viewed as reliable information based on sound journalistic principles.  So, a 
possibly less discerning electorate is being fed news and information from a small subset 
of sources and outlets.  While there are no separate standards for entertainment 
programming and advertising, as it relates to a matter as socially important as voting and 
                                                 
253 Cable and satellite enjoy greater freedom to broadcast indecent material that would be banned on 
broadcast stations.  The Internet is largely unregulated in almost all respects. 
254 The Parents Television Council is an “advocacy organization protecting children against sex, violence, 
and profanity in entertainment.”  See mission statement of organization, available at 
http://www.parentstv.org .  The Parents Television Council makes it incredibly easy for visitors to its 
website to file indecency complaints with the FCC.  The website provides multiple links directly to the 
FCC. 
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the civic function it should serve to all of American society, negative advertisements 
featuring indecent or sexually suggestive material should arguably be held to a higher 
standard.  Free over-the-air broadcasting has a uniquely special place in the American 
marketplace of ideas.255  It is available to everyone regardless of economic status and 
ideology.  Many households have abandoned subscription services altogether due to the 
questionable content and otherwise prohibitive costs associated with those subscription 
services.  Preserving at least one venue—over-the-air broadcasting—for balanced, 
relatively innocuous programming is important to the democracy and its inhabitants. 
 
Moreover, although there are no outright bona fide news exemptions to the 
indecency prohibition, if the FCC begins to recognize exceptions to the indecency rule, 
the exceptions could threaten to swallow the rule prohibiting the broadcast of indecent 
material.256  Its handling of “The Early Show” shows a willingness to extend these 
exemptions.  Recognition of formal exceptions to the indecency prohibition would extend 
the obscenity exceptions for artistic expression, bona fide news coverage, documentaries, 
news interviews, and of course political speech to indecency and profanity.257  Should 
this happen, an argument could be made that there is no compelling reason for 
maintaining the indecency rule.   
 
 
V. Resolution of the Statutory Conflict is Possible 
 
Congress and the FCC have left unresolved the question of whether a broadcaster 
will be subject to criminal prosecution in “future election-related conflicts” where the 
political speech is indeed indecent under the FCC’s and court’s definition of the term.258  
In light of the possibility of a questionably indecent political advertisement, however 
remote or how far in the distant future, a legally sound solution is warranted.  The Court’s 
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. is unlikely to resolve this conflict, but 
might provide guidance as to how the dilemma could be resolved.  That being the case, 
either the FCC, Congress, or lower courts will have to revisit this issue seeking to resolve 
the statutory dilemma.  Congress could resolve this dilemma in one of a number of 
different ways.259   
 
                                                 
255 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. 
256 Omnibus Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at  ¶ 71. 
257 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973);  47 U.S.C. § 315 does include exceptions for bona 
fide news cast, bona fide news interview, bona fide documentary, and on the spot coverage of bona fide 
news events. 
258 Mortlock, supra note 2, at 210-12. 
259 See id., at 219-27; Hille von Rosenvinge Sheppard, The Federal Communications Act and the Broadcast 
of Aborted Fetus Advertisements, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393 (1993); Lisa Suzanne Mangan, Aborting the 
Indecency Standard in Political Programming, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 73 (1993); Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez and Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air: Broadcasters and Indecent Political Advertising, 46 
FED. COMM. L.J. 267 (1994); Helene T. Schrier, Comment, A Solution to Indecency on the Airwaves, 41 
FED. COMM. L.J. 69 (1988); Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 
77 MARQ. L. REV. 385 (1994); Lili Levi, The FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 3 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 85 (1996). 
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In her comment, Samantha Mortlock correctly characterizes the broadcasters’ 
dilemma and proposes reasonable resolutions of the conflict.260  It has been suggested by 
other scholars that this statutory conflict may be resolved by either by amending, 
clarifying, or repealing the political broadcast rules.  It has been suggested that Congress 
could amend the reasonable access and equal opportunity statutes to expressly exclude 
political advertisements that include indecent, obscene, or profane material, effectively 
banning all broadcast indecency including that in political advertisements.  Second, 
Congress could expressly create an exception to the anti-censorship provisions of § 326 
and § 315 of the Communications Act, thus permitting broadcasters to channel indecent 
political advertisements to the safe harbor.  Third, Congress could completely repeal the 
reasonable access and equal opportunities provisions.    
 
Alternatively, Congress could permit all broadcast advertisements to be channeled 
to the safe harbor, thereby removing the discretion of broadcasters in deciding which 
advertisements are indecent and which ones are not.  An alternative and perhaps overall 
better solution would be to grant broadcasters immunity from violation and sanction 
under the indecency provisions in § 1464 by granting the same type of immunity 
currently granted broadcasters who broadcast political advertisements that defame an 
individual.  Also, Congress, the FCC, or the courts could clarify the definition of 
indecency. 
 
The earlier proposals include the suggestions (i) that Congress could amend 
and/or clarify the reasonable access and equal opportunity statutes to prohibit indecent 
material in political advertisements; (ii) that Congress repeal the reasonable access, equal 
opportunities, and anti-censorship provisions; (iii) that Congress expressly create an 
exception to the anti-censorship provisions of § 326 and § 315 of the Communications 
Act to permit broadcasters to channel indecent political advertisements to hours of the 
day when children are less likely to be in the viewing audience; (iv) that Congress require 
all broadcast advertisements to be channeled to the safe harbor, thereby removing the 
discretion of broadcasters in deciding which advertisements are indecent and which ones 
are not; and (v) that Congress grant broadcasters immunity from suit if they choose to air 
these advertisements.   
 
In addition to those proposals already offered, there are some other possible 
resolutions to this statutory conflict.  First, Congress could prohibit indecent material in 
political advertisements.  Second, Congress could take a more revolutionary approach 
and repeal the indecency rules altogether.  The Supreme Court’s decision in the fleeting 
expletives case has some bearing on the resolution of this statutory conflict to the extent 
that the Supreme Court could clarify or alter what constitutes indecent material and what 
degree of repetition is required for the FCC to impose sanctions.  Third, Congress could 
expand all of the rules in this tripartite to include all cable and satellite channels.  Finally, 
do nothing at all.  Each of these proposals has its strengths and infirmities and are 
discussed below.   
 
                                                 
260 See Mortlock, supra note 2, at 210-12, 220-26. 
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In light of the uncertainty surrounding the viability of the current indecency rules, 
any resolution that depends on a broadcaster’s actually assessing the content of an 
advertisement for indecency is bound to be problematic creating more problems than are 
solved.  The definition of indecency has proven difficult to apply particularly as it relates 
to fleeting images and utterances.  The standards from one station to the other and one 
community to another could be applied differently, making it nearly impossible for 
candidates to predict which advertisements will be accepted, and at which time of the 
broadcast day their advertisements might be aired.  This is an inefficient resolution that 
also could drive up costs to political candidates and broadcasters who engage in litigation 
over the issue of whether an advertisement was properly accepted, rejected, or channeled. 
 
In the absence of congressional action, this article suggests that courts should 
uphold existing case law regarding the treatment of fleeting and isolated expletives and 
remand any FCC order imposing forfeiture or finding indecent any utterances of fleeting 
expletives or fleeting depictions of indecent images.  In so doing, the courts continue to 
force the FCC to refine its indecency definition to address constitutional vagueness issues 
and to offer a more reasoned explanation for the need to change its longstanding policy of 
not acting on isolated or fleeting indecent material as required by the Administrative 
Procedures Act.261 
 
What follows is a discussion, in order of preference beginning with the grant of 
immunity to broadcasters in this situation, of some plausible resolutions to this matter. 
 
A. Amend § 1464 to Expressly Except Political Advertisements 
 
Congress could amend the indecency statute to expressly except political 
advertisements from the scope of the statute.  Such a resolution would continue to 
enforce the indecency prohibition against broadcasters in all other contexts, but would 
close the current loophole and provide clarity to broadcasters in situations in which they 
are presented with requests to air political advertisements containing indecent material.  
This alternative will not serve the larger issue of protecting children from harmful 
material that might be presented in a political advertisement, but it will preserve the right 
of a political candidate to present himself or herself to the electorate in the way he or she 
chooses.  It also preserves the right of the electorate to see the candidate as he or she 
really is and to make an informed decision as to whether to cast a vote for that candidate.  
 
Such a resolution to the dilemma, however, could be viewed as an endorsement of 
certain indecent speech and could undercut the government’s concern about subjecting 
viewers to the first blow inflicted by exposure to indecent material.  Critics might argue 
that the first blow is no less painful in this situation than it would be in other forms of 
broadcast material. 
 
B. Grant Immunity to Broadcasters  
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Congress could grant broadcasters immunity from suit if they choose to air these 
advertisements.  This is a good short- and long-term solution.  As others have suggested, 
this would be the better solution of all of the options as far as solving the statutory 
conflict.  Currently, there is no statute or case law providing immunity from liability in 
the event of indecent political speech, but such immunity has been recognized and upheld 
in the context of defamatory political speech.262   The effect of this option would be to 
grant broadcasters immunity from liability under the indecency provisions in Section 
1464 by granting the same type of immunity currently granted broadcasters who 
broadcast defamatory political advertisements.263 
 
This proposal, however, does nothing to solve the complimentary problem of the 
public airwaves being used as a vehicle for the distribution of indecent material.  The 
argument against a grant of immunity for broadcasters is that a vote for immunity likely 
would be interpreted by vocal opponents of broadcast indecency as a vote in favor of 
more broadcast indecency.  Additionally, while this proposal also solves the problem of 
disparate treatment of services—broadcasting, cable, and satellite—opponents of 
broadcast indecency could frame this as a repeal of an indecency regulation and therefore 
a step in the wrong moral direction.  They might prefer to see a prohibition of indecency 
not only on broadcast, but also on subscription services as well.  In other words, 
opponents of a grant of immunity in the context of indecent political advertisements 
probably would prefer, instead, broad prohibitions against indecency on all services and a 
express prohibition of indecency in political advertisements. 
 
This immunity could extend to indecent and profane material as well as racial 
hate speech and obscene speech in the spirit of revealing the true character of a candidate, 
but any such immunity clearly must be limited to the speech of qualified candidates for 
public office and should not grant any additional protection to broadcasters who use the 
public airwaves themselves to slander individuals or groups such as racial minorities.  
Nor should any such grant of immunity open the door for broadcasters to air any more 
indecent, profane, or obscene speech than is already permitted under § 1464 and the 
FCC’s current regulations. 
 
Scholars have suggested that perhaps it is nonsensical for Congress to grant 
broadcasters immunity from one of Congress’ own most controversial prohibitions.264  
Congress, however, creates exceptions to its statutes all the time.  Case in point is one of 
the very statutes creating this statutory dilemma.  Section 315 includes significant 
exceptions to the equal opportunities requirement.265 
                                                 
262 Farmers v. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 529-35. 
263 Id. 
264 See Mortlock, supra note 2, at 223-24 (asserting that because the conflict is between three federal 
statutes, it cannot be resolved by invoking the Supremacy Clause argument used in Farmers v. WDAY to 
find immunity for broadcasters of defamatory political speech). 
265 47 U.S.C. § 315 (exceptions where the appearance of a legally qualified candidate appears in “(1) a bona 
fide newscast; (2) a bona fide news interview; (3) a bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the 
candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary)); or 
DRAFT  DO NOT CITE 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
3/8/2009 
Last printed 3/8/2009 3:27:00 PM 
 
 




C. Repeal the Indecency Rules Altogether or Offer a Reasoned 
Explanation for Acting on Fleeting Indecency 
 
This proposal solves the statutory conflict, but it also arguably is the most 
controversial.  From a purely legal perspective, this seems to be a reasonable option to 
resolving many of the problems at hand—the unclear definition of indecency, the 
difficult application of the standards, and the disparate treatment of competing services.  
From a moral standpoint, however, this seems to be the wrong approach.  To allow 
opportunities for more sexually oriented material over the broadcast airwaves would 
seem to be a step in the wrong direction. 
 
The hurdles to be crossed to effectuate this proposal are quite high.  On the one 
hand, the continued wisdom of the indecency prohibition has been called into question as 
evidenced in no small part by the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the appeals of the 
fleeting expletive cases.  Moreover, as discussed, herein, the distinction between cable 
and satellite service on the one hand and traditional broadcast service on the other hand, 
regarding how the services are regulated by the FCC does not make much sense.266  A 
majority of Americans receive television service via a subscription service provided 
either by a cable company or a satellite service provider.  Most consumers of television 
programming make very little practical distinction between the services when channel 
surfing or program selection.  Consequently, it makes very little sense that the 
broadcaster occupying channel 9 on the channel line up is subject to one set of rules when 
the cable channel on channel 19 abides by a different set of rules.  In the context of 
political broadcast advertisements, it is nonsensical to impose upon political candidates 
one set of rules when broadcasting on cable or satellite but another set when broadcasting 
on traditional broadcast stations.  Perhaps the broadcast indecency rules have seen better 
days. 
 
This alternative gets right at the issues before the U.S. Court of Appeals and the 
U.S. Supreme Court relating to the Commission’s departure from 30 years of policy of 
not acting on fleeting expletives and images.  The FCC has had a difficult time 
articulating a reasoned explanation for changing the longstanding policy.  As it currently 
stands, the FCC really may not sanction fleeting images and expletives under current 
                                                                                                                                                 
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and 
activities incidental thereto)”). 
266 See Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiary and Causation Quandary for Medium-Specific Laws 
Targeting Sexual and Violent Content:  First Proving Harm and Injury to Silence Speech, then Proving 
Redress and Rehabilitation Through Censorship, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 157 (2008).  Calvert criticizes the 
“underinclusiveness” of the FCC’s medium-specific regulation of minors’ access to indecent, profane, and 
violent material where broadcasters and providers of subscription services are regulated differently.  
Calvert explores the legislative dilemma presented by the Second Circuit’s decision on Fox relating to 
fleeting expletives.  He suggests that “two knotty questions” now face legislators:  (1) proving harm and (2) 
proving redress by providing sufficient evidence that the regulatory scheme actually remedies the problem 
of exposure of children to harmful material. 
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rules, as the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals have found the rules arbitrary 
and capricious.267  In light of these rulings, the FCC has to retool these prohibitions.  
Courts could continue to vacate and remand the FCC’s orders until the agency finally 
gets it right.  Courts have said that the FCC must offer a reasoned explanation for its 
recent policy shifts on fleeting indecency.  The only other alternative would be to adhere 
to longstanding policy or to repeal the rules.  While this might ultimately be the long-
term best solution it does little to address the short-term issues of broadcasters, political 
candidates, or the principles of democracy.   
 
Broadcasters argue that the current indecency rules put them at an economic 
disadvantage compared to cable and satellite services particularly in this era of 
communications convergence and due to the widespread availability of more advanced 
communications services.268  Under the current rules, television and radio broadcasters 
are prohibited from airing the type of racy programming that has been popular of recent 
on the subscription channels.  Cable and satellite television and radio channels are not 
subject to these indecency prohibitions and, therefore, may air more harsh language and 
more crude sexual content any time of the day, not just during the safe harbor. 
 
The FCC could expand each of the rules to include all cable and satellite 
channels.  This proposal would require all cable, satellite, and broadcast stations to 
provide reasonable access and equal opportunities to political candidates and would 
prohibit indecent material on all services equally.  The benefit, of course, is that it could 
potentially benefit the political process by securing access to more outlets for political 
candidates.  This benefits the electorate and arguably society as a whole.  Such a 
resolution might be favored by proponents of rules that remove indecency from all of 
television.  Groups like the Parents Television Council are concerned about the 
prevalence of profanity and sexual content on all services, not just broadcast television.269 
 
The problem, however, is that the terrible confusion surrounding broadcast 
indecency would then be introduced to the subscription services arena as well.270  While 
one problem would be solved, a larger one would be created.  Disallowing all indecency 
                                                 
267 Fox V. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2nd Cir. 2007); CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
268 See Lili Levi, Chairman Kevin Martin on Indecency:  Enhancing Agency Power, A Response to Kevin 
Martin et al., Expansion of Indecency Regulation, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 32 (2007) (“In a world in which 
distinctions between cable and broadcast are in many ways chimerical and in which cable has experimented 
with edgier programming, continuing stringent enforcement of indecency rules against broadcast stations 
would simply disadvantage broadcasters vis-à-vis their regulatory exempt competitors without significantly 
reducing the availability of sexual content on television. This Response does not claim 
that à la carte will necessarily lead to the consequences detailed above. It simply argues that the Chairman’s 
failure to address the possibility that à la carte distribution could lead to either overbroad or underinclusive 
speech regulation is a significant omission.”). 
269 See Ted Hearn, Stevens Adds Cable to Indecency Jihad, Multichannel News, Mar. 7, 2005, at 1, 21.  
FCC Chairman Kevin Martin and Senator Ted Stevens have called for regulating indecency on cable and 
satellite services.  See Open Forum on Decency:  Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation, 109th Cong. 9-12 (Nov. 29, 2005).  Transcript available at http://www.commerce. 
senate.gov/pdf/decency2.pdf. 
270 See Clay Calvert, supra at note 266.   
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even on cable and satellite potentially raises more significant constitutional issues 
including First Amendment challenges than even those raised by application of the rules 
to broadcasters.271  While this proposal would put all services on equal footing, the 
unfortunate result, of course, is to extend the dilemma to more services than it already is, 
thus exacerbating the statutory dilemma at issue in this article. 
 
Any such economic-disadvantage type argument made by broadcasters, however, 
must be informed by the fact that broadcasters operate in a highly regulated industry and 
pursuant to a license which does not confer on them an absolute fee simple ownership 
right.272  Because of this limitation, broadcasters are not entitled to any expectation of 
treatment on parity with that of subscription services.  While it is true that subscription 
services do use the public airwaves, and that satellite service providers are subject to 
licensing of their satellites and earth stations, they simply are not regulated in the same 
way as are broadcast licensees.  This quasi-private property nature of subscription 
services is in part why the FCC has not to date extended the broadcast rules to satellite 
and cable services.273    
 
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of indecency complaints in recent years 
have been generated by a small group of individuals and organizations, namely the 
Parents Television Council.  With ratings for cable television programs rising, arguably, 
American viewers and listeners are not as offended by the state of broadcast 
programming as the increased number of indecency complaints would suggest.274  
Therefore, perhaps the indecency rules no longer are necessary or desirable by the 
contemporary viewing community. 
 
On the other hand, while most indecency complaints in recent years are the result 
of a very active watchdog group, many Americans if pressed on the issue might reveal a 
strong distaste for the crass material on broadcast as well as cable and satellite 
channels.275  While not compelled to complain to the FCC about this content, they might 
indeed desire greater federal control and regulation of the indecent television and radio 
programming on all services, particularly due to the lack of distinction in their 
consumption of the services.  In sum, they might favor increased regulation of cable and 
satellite services as well.  The public’s response to such a proposal turns at least in part 
                                                 
271 See Clay Calvert, Bono, the Culture Wars, and a Profane Decision:  The FCC’s Reversal of Course on 
Indecency Determinations and Its New Path on Profanity, 28 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 61 (2004). 
272 See Radio Act of 1927, 44 Sta. 1162 (no private ownership of airwaves—permission to use airwaves 
conferred by government in form of a license).  A license is a non-possessory right to use or go over the 
property of another for a specific purpose.  See, e.g., Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 111 Fla. 22, 27; 149 
So. 759, 761 (1933) (“A license is a mere permit to use the property of another.”), Tatum v. Dance, 605 So. 
2d 110(1992) (“ a license is merely a personal right to use the property of another for a specific purpose.”). 
273 The FCC has long resisted calls to extend its indecency regulations to subscription services.  See John C. 
Quale and Malcolm J. Tuesley, Space, the Final Frontier—Expanding FCC Regulation of Indecent Content 
onto Direct Broadcast Satellite, 60 FED. COMM. L. J. 37 (2007). 
274 See Nielsen Ratings.  
275 The Parents Television Council is a media watchdog group that seeks to address the prevalence of sex, 
violence, and profanity on television and radio via enforcement of existing rules and influencing ongoing 
communications policy.   See http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/aboutus/main.asp. 
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on whether the Parents Television Council and groups like it are speaking on behalf of a 
silent majority or a vocal minority.  Perhaps the general viewing and listening public 
simply have become particularly desensitized to broadcast content, or perhaps they are 
not offended, or perhaps they are offended but just not to the point of filing a formal 
complaint.  It is difficult to tell which is the case.   
 
Regarding fleeting expletives, a compelling argument could be made that children 
are harmed just as much by the cumulative effects of repeated exposure to isolated and 
fleeting expletives over time as they are by exposure to material in a single broadcast that 
dwells on or repeats sexual or excretory material or activity.  The bottom line is that once 
a child is exposed to this content, it is forever emblazoned in the child’s psyche.  
Therefore, it could be argued that isolated expletives are just as harmful as material that 
dwells or repeats the material.  This essentially is the FCC’s argument supporting its 
policy change.  It should be of no or little consequence that the FCC is slow in coming to 
this conclusion—nearly 30 years to be exact.  Federal agencies must be allowed to revise 
its policies after careful consideration of the past and anticipated future effectiveness of 
those policies.  Perhaps the FCC just needs to articulate this more clearly in order to 
justify not only its policy change, but also to justify retention of the indecency and 
profanity restrictions altogether. 
 
 
D. Change the Definition of Indecent Material 
 
The definition of indecent material could be changed to include not just patently 
offensive material that describes sexual or excretory activities or organs, but also to 
include any material that could be harmful to children.  The FCC could refine the 
definition of indecency to include sexually suggestive as well as racially offensive speech 
such as that of J.B. Stoner.276  Under current application of indecency principles, the 
word “shit” would be indecent, whereas “nigger” is not.  Both are equally offensive.  
Also, it could include depiction of gruesome images such as aborted fetuses as well as all 
fleeting images and utterances of indecent and/or offensive speech.   
Such a vague and broad definition, however, is sure to be found to run afoul of the 
First Amendment.277  Despite the likely constitutional hurdle, this solution could resolve 
the statutory conflict while simultaneously protecting children from various forms of 
harmful speech.  Additionally, hate speech also enjoys significant First Amendment 
protection despite the psychological harm caused by the speech to the individuals and 
groups it targets and despite the overall harm to society caused by the speech.278  
Generally, racist speech is protected except in the workplace where it creates a hostile 
work environment, or it constitutes fighting words creating a true threat of violence.279 
                                                 
276 See Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944-45; Stoner I, 36 F.C.C.2d at 636.   
277 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
278 See e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
279 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
(striking a city ordinance banning bias-motivated crimes such as cross burnings because the statute 
prohibited otherwise permitted speech and stating that the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to impose special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects); and see 
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The anti-censorship provisions in § 326 and § 315 are further evidence of the 
freedoms afforded political candidates wishing to use the public broadcast airwaves in 
furtherance of their campaigns.280  In the political broadcast context, the FCC acquiesced 
to this general rule in the case of J.B. Stoner in upholding the right of access afforded 
candidates for federal elective office by 47 U.S.C. § 312 and rejecting efforts to 
characterize racist speech as indecent or obscene.281   
 
This resolution would require the Commission to offer a reasoned explanation for 
changing its longstanding policy of not punishing the broadcast of fleeting expletives, 
fleeting images, or various forms of hate speech.282 
 
E. Amend and/or Clarify the Reasonable Access and Equal Opportunity 
Statutes to Prohibit Indecent Material in Broadcast Political 
Advertisements 
 
Congress could clarify or amend the reasonable access and equal opportunity 
statutes to expressly exclude indecent political advertisements.  To do so, would close the 
loophole in the three conflicting statutes and effectively ban all indecent broadcast 
material from the airwaves during the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.—the non-safe 
harbor hours.  This proposal hurts broadcasters more so than candidates or the election 
process.  Candidates would be free to put their advertisements on cable and satellite 
channels and on the Internet bypassing broadcasters altogether.  Voters likewise could 
receive the candidate’s message simply by switching to the Internet or to a cable or 
satellite channel.  The public still, however, might be subjected to indecent material 
which might be harmful to children. 
 
The wisdom of this solution is highly questionable, as currently it is not even 
clear that Congress and the FCC should ban any indecent material on broadcast stations 
at all.  Currently, the overwhelming majority of television viewers have abandoned 
reliance on traditional over the air broadcast choosing instead to subscribe to either cable 
or satellite service.  That being the case, most consumers today draw little distinction 
                                                                                                                                                 
In re: KGEZ(AM), Kalispell, MT, Facility ID No. 60575, Skyline Broadcasters, Inc., 22 F.C.C.R. 8395 
(2007) (denying petitions to deny license renewal and reiterating that “if there is to be free speech, it must 
be free speech that we abhor and hate as well as for speech that we find tolerable and congenial”).  Zapis 
Communications Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 3888 (MB 1992) (citing Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Memorandum Opinion, 4 F.C.C. 2d 190, 192 (1966), aff'd, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C. 2d 385 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith v. FCC, 403 F. 2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). 
280 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 326. 
281 See Stoner II, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944-45.  See also Clay Calvert, Imus, Indecency, Violence & Vulgarity:  
Why the FCC Must Not Expand Its Authority Over Content, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4, 10-16 
(2007) (suggesting that any attempts to expand the definition of broadcast indecency to include racist and 
sexist speech will be void for vagueness).   
282 See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, cert. granted Fox v. FCC, 128 S. Ct. 1647, 170 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2008), 07-
582 (2007) (addressing the isolated and fleeting use of various forms of the words “shit” and “fuck” and 
other profane material).; and see CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2008).  
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between broadcast and cable television stations as they are consumed via cable and 
satellite services nearly indistinguishably.  As such, the relevance of the different 
treatment of broadcast services and subscription services, which are not subject to the 
same prohibitions against airing indecent material, for the purpose of the public interest 
in protecting children from indecent material has little continued value or relevance since 
indecent material is not prohibited on cable and satellite channels or on the Internet.  
Perhaps statutory law and agency regulations should reflect this market change.   
 
Additionally, the difficulty in determining what is indecent opens the door to 
greater confusion.  This alternative leaves too much discretion in the hands of 
broadcasters and the opportunity for misuse or misapplication of the rules and the 
indecency standard.  Until the definition of indecency and its application are clarified, 
this solution is unacceptable. 
 
F. Permit Channeling of Indecent Political Advertisements to the Safe 
Harbor 
 
Congress could expressly create an exception to the anti-censorship provisions of 
§ 326 and § 315 of the Communications Act to permit broadcasters to channel indecent 
political advertisements to the safe harbor hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. when children 
are less likely to be in the viewing audience.  Without this exception, such attempts to 
channel political advertisements to particular hours of the broadcast day would violate the 
express prohibitions against censorship and contradict the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 
Becker.283 
 
If broadcasters are given the authority to so channel indecent political 
advertisements, the potential harm to children would be diminished albeit only to the 
extent that the underlying assumption that children are less likely to be in the viewing 
audience actually holds true.  Permitting channeling of select advertisements, however, 
has some other more identifiable problems.   
 
The most obvious problem is associated with the difficulty in actually defining 
what constitutes indecent material.  Again, there is too much discretion left to the 
broadcasters to apply a confusing and unclear set of rules.  Because neither the courts, 
Congress, nor the FCC have been able to provide broadcasters clear guidance as to what 
material it will sanction, broadcasters might err on the side of caution and channel more 
material than is necessary.284  While the definition of what constitutes indecency becomes 
somewhat clearer with each court decision, and hopefully will become clearer when the 
court rules on the fleeting expletives cases, few broadcasters necessarily want to put their 
licenses in jeopardy and incur the huge costs of litigation to defend a decision to air a 
political broadcast ad in order for a case to work its way through the judicial system.  
                                                 
283 Becker, 95 F.3d at 84-85. 
284 B. Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure:  An Economic Approach to Removing the Boob from the Tube, 13 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 195 (2006) (highlighting the FCC’s inconsistent and ineffective application of the 
indecency definition and advocating for the creation of an Indecency Review Board to rectify the situation). 
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Conversely, broadcasters could find themselves liable for having channeled an 
advertisement that the courts ultimately find was not indecent and should not have been 
relegated to the safe harbor.  Either way, the broadcaster loses. 
 
The media should simply be the forum for discussion and distribution of ideas, 
not the censor of the message.  In light of the FCC’s current activity in the indecency 
arena, and the lack of clarity as to what actually constitutes indecent material, 
broadcasters should not be pushed into a corner.  To do so would potentially quell speech 
as broadcasters, fearful of indecency forfeitures, would become overly cautious and 
might reject too many requests for political air time.   
 
A related problem is that of discriminatory treatment of indecent advertisements 
and those that are not.  A large segment of the viewing audience might be deprived of the 
opportunity to view advertisements that might be aired only in the wee hours of the 
morning.  Not only is the candidate harmed in that he or she is not given access to the 
same audience as might be his or her competitors, but so is the entire electorate.  This 
solution would undoubtedly trigger litigation claiming discriminatory treatment of 
political speech and harm to the electorate. 
 
The government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on 
speech so long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant 
government interest.285  Channeling is more like permissible time, place, and manner 
restrictions and should be permitted.  This is separation of indecent material suitable for 
adults, but not children, generally is accomplished in broadcasting by channeling 
indecent programming to the safe harbor.  The Commission has held that requiring 
indecent broadcast material to be channeled in this way is a reasonable and narrow time, 
place, and manner restriction consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded 
other media.286 
 
One may argue, however, that granting broadcasters the authority to channel 
certain advertisements to the safe harbor while permitting others to be broadcast during 
the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. is discriminatory because the time of day the 
advertisements would be broadcast would be channeled based solely on the content of the 
message. 
 
Neither Congress nor the FCC should push any policies permitting broadcasters to 
refuse to air these advertisements.  Fostering a free marketplace of ideas political arena 
free from censorship requires that neither broadcasters nor the government quell political 
speech.  While it is quite another story were the broadcaster itself make hateful, obscene, 
indecent, or profane comments in other contexts, it could be said convincingly that 
allowing political candidates to reveal their true selves through their political 
advertisements, no matter how distasteful, is actually in the public’s best interest. 
                                                 
285 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). 
286 Pacifica M&O, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699, ¶ 15. 
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A collateral benefit of airing even negative material is that the advertisements say 
as much about the sponsor of the advertisement as they do about the person being 
attacked.  It takes a truly unique political candidate to use the word “nigger” or any other 
racially offensive term on television or the radio or to use the public airwaves during 
prime time to air indecent, obscene, or profane material wholly inappropriate for 
children.  Perhaps the public is better off having had this information available to it.  The 
electorate in many ways is made better off by insight into the character of a sponsor of 
such advertisement which goes directly to the public’s determination as to whether a 
candidate who sponsors such a negative advertisement is ripe to be entrusted with the 
public trust that is commensurate with holding public office.  The public is better served 
by having had access to this information prior to the election than to find out after a 
candidate wins the office and then begins to carry out his or her governmental authority 
in a manner offensive, oppressive, or discriminatory to the general public he or she has 
been elected to serve. 
 
Allowing the advertisements to show the true fiber and character of a candidate is 
better for society in the long run to the extent that the electorate can see past the hype and 
hysteria to the true message and messenger.  Politically correct speech may conceal the 
true character of a candidate, which is not always in society’s overall best interest.  On 
the other hand, this type of speech by a candidate may stoke negative stereotypes or may 
be unnecessarily divisive.  Nevertheless, it is better that the public know this about a 
candidate prior to the election. 
 
F. Require or Permit Channeling of all Political Advertisements to the 
Safe Harbor 
 
Congress could require all broadcast advertisements to be channeled to the safe 
harbor, thereby removing the discretion of broadcasters in deciding which advertisements 
are indecent and which ones are not.  Such a requirement might be found to be an 
unconstitutionally overbroad attempt to regulate a very small subset of otherwise 
permissible speech.  Additionally, to do so would potentially harm the entire political 
process, the political advertisement would take on the same status as late night 
infomercials.  They would be rendered ineffective as the potential audience reach would 
be significantly reduced.  Any such regulation that allowed for broadcaster discretion to 
channel or not to channel would suffer from the same problems as that of permitting 
broadcasters to refuse to air indecent advertisements as broadcasters still would have to 
make the initial determination of indecency which in and of itself if wrought with 
problems.  This proposal does not necessarily help the overall political process. 
 
Overall, this is a more equitable resolution than those options depending on 
licensees’ determinations of indecency.  Nevertheless, this resolution severely 
undermines concerns about protecting political candidates’ access to a broad audience 
and about not shutting candidates out from certain hours of the day when that audience 
might be largest. 
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G. Wait and See/Do Nothing At All 
 
Courts and Congress could simply wait and see what the FCC does when a 
licensee actually does broadcast an indecent political advertisement.  Because some feel 
the possibility of an indecent political advertisement is remote, regulators might prefer 
this alternative.  They would be waiting particularly to see whether the Commission 
receives any complaints about the broadcast and whether it issues a Notice of Apparent 
Liability and forfeiture against the broadcaster for the indecent broadcast.  The FCC 
could set forth a policy of not acting on such complaints in the context of political 
advertisements or could issue a forfeiture which it would have to substantiate particularly 
if the material is fleeting in nature.  Pursuing this course, however, fails to provide 
broadcasters with sufficient notice of what broadcast material the Commission will or 
will not sanction.  
 
Doing nothing at all does not seem particularly troublesome if you take past 
inaction as an indicator of the possibility of a legal issue.  However, it is only a matter of 
time before this rationale collapses.  Just because the FCC has had no problem resolving 
the issue in the past, this is so simply because the FCC has not yet been presented with a 
case involving a political advertisement containing material that falls within the FCC’s 
definition of indecency. 
 
The FCC very well might sanction a broadcaster under pressure from groups like 
the Parents Television Council or political rivals of the candidate supporting the 
advertisement.  Until the Commission has a real case before it, which route it will take 
remains a mystery. 
 
 
H. Repeal the Reasonable Access, Equal Opportunities, and Anti-
Censorship Provisions Altogether 
 
Repeal of the reasonable access, equal opportunities, and anti-censorship 
provisions could eliminate the conflict.  Were these provisions to be repealed, a licensee 
would be free to reject a candidate seeking to broadcast a message to which the licensee 
objected or found otherwise undesirable.  If a licensee voluntarily were to permit 
candidates access to its station for the purpose of political speech, then the licensee could 
be subject to the indecency provisions of § 1464.   
 
The problem with this proposal is obvious.  Licensees would be free to 
discriminate against one candidate in favor of another or others.  Licensees would be 
given too much power over candidates’ access to the electorate via the public airwaves.  
Not only would candidates be harmed by such a policy, but so would the general public 
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Even if the advertisements in the new genre of racy political advertisements do 
not meet the definition of indecency, they are dangerously close to the tipping point that 
the courts and the FCC have danced around for many years.  They are closer to the realm 
of broadcast indecency than are the abortion advertisements of the 1990s and the racially 
offensive advertisements of the 1970s, yet not quite as egregious as the wardrobe 
malfunction of Superbowl XXXVIII, nudity of “NYPD Blue” or the expletives of the 
various awards shows that have suffered the wrath of the FCC in recent years.  
Nevertheless, in the context of promoting a democratic society in which voters are 
adequately informed about candidates’ stance on substantive issues, these advertisements 
lack any serious political merit and add little to nothing of value to the political process. 
 
The appropriate solution to this dilemma, however, is not to revoke reasonable 
access and equal opportunities for political candidates, for to do so would frustrate the 
public interest obligations of broadcasters.  Nor is the answer to prohibit indecent 
material from political advertisements because of the risk of censorship and the 
possibility of undue influence of the media on the political process.  Absent a complete 
repeal of the indecency ban altogether, which could be on the horizon and legally 
justifiable, the more appropriate solution to this dilemma is to close the current loophole 
left open by the three existing statutes and afford broadcasters the same type of immunity 








                                                 
287 See Farmers v. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 530-35. 
